Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1973

Mind-Body Identity, Incorrigibility and Conceptual Revision
Gordon D. Cohen
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses

Recommended Citation
Cohen, Gordon D., "Mind-Body Identity, Incorrigibility and Conceptual Revision" (1973). Master's Theses.
2689.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2689

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1973 Gordon D. Cohen

MIND-BODY IDENTITY, INCORRIGIBILITY

AND CONCEPTUAL REVISION

Gordon D. Cohen

1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy,
Loyola University of Chicago

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

CHAPTER
I

INTRODUCTION • • • •

II

LAWS AND SENSATIONS

III
IV

" v·

.............
• • • . . . . . . . . . .

1
23

SENSATION-EXPLANATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL REVISION 59
INCORRIGIBILITY AND MIND-BODY IDENTITY.

106

INCORRIGIBILITY AND THE EEG ARGUMENT. • • • • 155
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • 181

' •..

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Classical materialism maintained that a man was nothing over and above a vast arrangement of particles in motion.
Modern materialism differs from classical materialism in refusing to specify the kind of entities which ultimately make
up the furniture of the world, including man.

These enti-

ties may turn out not to be particles or anything like particles.

It is the science of the future to which we must look

for the answer to this question.

But modern materialism

agrees with classical materialism in the prediction that
everything in the world, including the behavior of man,
will be completely explicable in terms of entities which
fall wholly within the province of physics.

Because of this

emphasis on the idea that we must await the outcome of scientific inquiry, perhaps in some far distant future, to know
what man is, modern materialism is sometimes called scientific materialism.

Professor J.J.C. Smart, a leading expon-

ent of scientific materialism, confesses his faith, in the
following well-known passage, in the power of science
finally to come up with the definitive answer to this
question which has perplexed philosophers from at least
1

2

the time of Socrates:
It seems to me that science is increasingly giving
us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen
as physicochemical mechanisms: it seems that even
the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable
in mechanistic terms. There does seem to be, so far as
science is concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents.
All except for one place: in consciousness • • • •
[S]ensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be
the one sort of thing left outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe
that this can be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics • • • except the occurrence of
sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.l
It should be clear from this passage that Smart would consider the scientific materialist to have made out his case
once he has shown that the occurrence of sensations is explicable in terms of physics.

This might seem at first

. glance a strange position to take, if not a disingenuous
one, in view of the serious objections which have been
raised to any form of materialism by Thomistically oriented
philosophers and contemporary phenomenologists with respect
to thoughts and their intentionality.

It is nevertheless

an understandable position for those philosophers who, following Descartes, reject anything as a criterion of the
mental, such as intentionality, which might serve to exclude

111 sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review,
VO l. 6 8 ( 19 5 9 ) 1 p • 14 2 •
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sensations from the realm of the mental.

Most defenders

of scientific materialism, in fact, follow Descartes on
this point.

In any case, the issue which is currently at

the center of controversy between scientific materialists
and their opponents concerns the status of sensations rather
than thoughts.
The attempt to show that the occurrence of sensations
is explicable in physicalistic terms has consisted in recent
years in the defense of what is now simply called the Identity Theory.

The central claim of this theory is that it

makes sense to assert that empirical inquiry will discover
that sensations are identical with certain brain processes.
The theory does not claim that empirical inquiry will discover
that sensations are identical with certain brain processes
but only that it makes sense to assert that it will.

This

is in line with the previously mentioned hesitation to speculate now upon the outcome of future empirical inquiry concerning the nature of man.

But, in view of such diffidence,

why should it be thought important to establish the
meaningfulness of asserting that empirical inquiry will
discover that sensations are identical with· certain brain
processes?

The answer is that materialists cannot be

4

satisfied with a mere correlation between sensations and
physical states or processes.

There is a sense in which

some forms of relation which have been thought to hold between sensations and physical states or processes make the
occurrence of the former explicable in physicalistic terms.
Such is the case with epiphenomenalism, which maintains that
the occurrence of sensations can be wholly accounted for by
•

occurrences within the body.

Such forms of relation do not

help the materialist, however, since he wants to hold that
the occurrence of sensations is explicable in physicalistic
terms in the sense that the former is nothing over and above
the latter.

His position is, therefore, that sensations

are identical with certain physical states or processes in
some sense of "identical."

Moreover, for analogous reasons,

materialists cannot be satisfied with a mere correlation
between properties of sensations and properties of those
physical states or processes with which sensations have been
identified, as would be maintained by the double-aspect
theory.

Does this mean that the corresponding properties

must also be held identical in some sense of "identical?"
There seems to be no general agreement among materialists

5

on this point.

Indeed, the problem of what to do with prop-

erties has proved a most difficult one and has occasioned
some of the subtlest reasoning on this topic.
Now there is a straightforward sense of "identical" in
which sensations have been claimed to be identical with certain physical states or processes.

This is the sense which

expresses the relation of "strict identity," that is, the relation such that
(x) (y) ( (x =

y)

::l

(F) (Fx

= Fy)) •

Thus, if a given sensation is strictly identical with (say)
a certain brain process, then all (nonintentional and nonmodal) properties truly predicable of the sensation are
truly predicable of the brain process, and conversely.

On

the face of it, however, strict identity cannot hold between
sensations and brain processes, or, for that matter, between
sensations and any other physical states or processes.
this "cannot" is logical.

And

It is not simply that some proper-

ties truly predicable of a sensation are not in fact truly
predicable of any physical state or process, or conversely.
Rather, some properties truly predicable of the one are apparently not predicable at all of the other.

For the predicates
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which express these properties seem to be of a different

log~

ical type than the expressions which refer to the other.
They seem to belong to different "logical categories" or to
different "logical spaces" or to different "language-games."
Thus, while we certainly can say that a pain, for example, is
throbbing or becomes more or less intense, it would seem to be
not merely false but, in a certain sense, senseless to apply
these predicates to physical processes such as brain processes.

Again, while a brain process can be correctly said

to be occurring three feet from the kitchen table, to apply
this predicate to the experience of having a pain would seem
to result in a certain kind of nonsense.

Further, the rela-

tion of identity between sensations and brain processes would
have to be contingent, since (to mention only one reason) a
person who reports sensations need know nothing about brain
processes.

But contingent identity can hold only between

terms which are independently identifiable, and this seems
to imply that sensations must have some properties that are
not reducible to physicalistic properties.

In view of con-

siderations such as these, philosophers, especially socalled "linguistic" philosophers, have charged materialists
with coIP.mitting "categOI"'.f mistakes" or with being guilty of

7

"conceptual confusion. 11

Materialists, accordingly, have

thought it important in recent years to defend the view that
it is sensible to assert that empirical inquiry will discover that sensations are identical with certain brain processes, however diffident they may be about what empirical
inquiry will in fact discover.
It may be thought that the shortest way with objections
of this kind is to argue that sensations are identical with
certain brain processes in a sense other than that of strict
identity.

But this is not the case.

For it is difficult to

see what other sense of "identical" there can be which does
not reduce simply to mere "correlation."

For this reason,

some philosophers who defend the Identity Theory claim that
it is the sense of strict identity in which sensations are
identical to certain brain processes, but then go on to argue
that this claim does not involve one in category mistakes
or conceptual confusion.

Smart is one of the most notable

of such philosophers in recent years.

Smart argues that

sensation reports are neutral between psychic and physicalistic logical categories because such reports are simply
classifications of sensations in terms of bare

8

. · 1 ar1•t•ies.
s1m1

1

Thus, "I have a pain," according to Smart, is

roughly equivalent to "What is going on in me is like what
goes on in me when a pin is stuck into me."

The analysans in

this case simply reports similarities without saying wherein
these similarities consist.

One focus of controversy over

this translation version of the Identity Theory concerns the
adequacy of such proposed translations.

It has been objected,

for example, that these rough equivalences cannot be transformed into strict equivalences without a corresponding
loss of their neutrality. 2

Richard Rorty, another well-

known defender of the Identity Theory, regards objections
of this kind as ineluctable for any version of the Identity
Theory which claims strict identity between sensations and
brain processes and so has chosen the more difficult task
of trying to make clear a sense of identity which is neither strict identity nor a relation that reduces to mere
correlation and which could sensibly be asserted to hold

1

see ibid., pp. 149-50. The version of the Identity
Theory which Smart defends was originally put forward by U.
T. Place ("Is Consciousness a Brain Process?," British
Journal of Psychology, vol. 47 (1956), pp. 44-50), but it is
Smart's article that has received most attention.
·
2 see Kurt Baier, "Smart on Sensations,~· Australasian
Journal of Philoso~hy, vol. 40 (1962), p. 66, n. 23, and
James W. Cornman,The Identity of Mind and Body," Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 59 (1962), pp. 489-90.
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between sensations and certain brain processes.

In the

course of the article in which Rorty introduces his own
theory, 1 Smart's theory is summarily discussed and dismissed
by appeal to the difficulty of providing adequate translations.

But even in this early article, it is clear that

Rorty's disagreement with Smart runs much deeper.

The basic

issue dividing them is not so much the possibility of providing adequate translations as it is the possibility of reporting bare similarities.

The latter seems to imply that there

is an activity which can reasonably be called "awareness"
prior to the learning of language.

Rorty, however, wishes

to ally himself with Wittgenstein and many of his followers
in the battle against such a notion of awareness--a battle,
indeed, which he takes as having already been won.

More

specifically, what Wittgenstein and his followers have
argued and Rorty accepts is that the possibility of picking
out something as an object of awareness requires that it be
identifiable as an item of some definite sort and that the
classification of items just consists in the classification

111 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," Review

of Metaphysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp. 24-54.
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of expressions for them according to the conceptual scheme
embedded in a language.

Expressions for sensations, accord-

ingly, must be tied up logically, that is, in conformity
with the rules of the conceptual scheme, with other sorts
of eA-pressions if the former are to be referring expressions
at all.
Now this view would seem to be inconsistent with the
claim that it makes sense to assert the identity of sensations and brain processes.

For if there is no possibility

of reporting bare similarities, the need for providing independent identifications of both terms between which the contingent identity relation is supposed to hold can apparently
be satisfied only by the recognition of irreducibly psychic
properties.

And then it is not easy to see how the Identity

Theorist can escape the charge that he is committing "category mistakes" or is guilty of "conceptual confusion."

Rorty

proposes a way out for the Identity Theorist who sympathizes
with Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of pre-linguistic
awareness.

We can simply change the conceptual scheme which

is embedded in the language we speak.
[T]he classifications of linguistic expressions that
are the ground of [the Identity Theorist's] opponents'
criticism are classifications of a language which is
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as it is because it is the language spoken at a given
stage of empirical inquiry. But the sort of empirical
results that would show brain processes and sensations
to be identical would also bring about changes in our
ways of speaking. These changes would make these
classifications out of date • • • • There is simply
no such thing as a method of classifying linguistic
expressions that has results guaranteed to remain intact despite the results of future empirical inquiry. 1
once these changes are made, we can go on (sensibly) to assert that sensations are identical with certain brain processes, meaning by "identical" here "the sort of relation
which obtains between, to put it crudely, existent entities
and non-existent entities when reference to the latter once
served (some of) the purposes presently served by reference
to the former--the sort of relation that holds, e.g., between 'quantity of caloric fluid' and 'mean kinetic energy
of molecules.'"

2

To put it less crudely, Rorty is propos-

ing that the statement
Sensations are identical with certain brain processes
should be analyzed as
What people now call "sensations" are identical with
certain brain processes
where the word "identical" in the analysans, but not in

1 Rorty, ibid., pp. 24-25.
2

Rorty, ibid., p. 26.
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the analysandum, signifies the relation of strict identity.
The reason why the word "identical" in the analysandum cannot signify the relation of strict identity is that the expression being used for what is asserted to be identical
with certain brain processes does not belong to the same
logical category to which some predicates true of brain processes belong.

The analysans neatly avoids this difficulty

by embedding the of fending expression in a context in which
it occurs non-referentially.

Although the word "sensations"

does occur in the expression used to refer to what is asserted to be identical with certain brain processes, "sensations" is not itself being used to refer; it is not being
used at all but only mentioned.

And so far as the expres-

sion which is being used to refer is concerned, viz., "What
people now call 'sensations,'" there seems to be no reason
why it should not be in the same logical category as any
predicate true of brain processes.
As subtle and ingenious as this strategy is, it is a
strategy, I think, for losing the war in which Wittgenstein
and some of his followers were engaged when, according to
Rorty, they won the battle against the notion of prelingui$tic awareness.

Rorty admits, and indeed it is

13

difficult to deny, that the discourse in favor of which
sensation-discourse is to be eliminated would serve only
some of the purposes presently served by the latter.

That

brain-discourse would not serve, at least initially, the expressive purposes served by sensation-discourse goes without
question.
here.

Such purposes, however, are not what is at issue

In any case, they could be provided for in other ways

if necessary.

More to the point, sensation-discourse tends

to give rise to certain kinds of questions about ourselves
and the world and leaves room for certain kinds of answers
to these questions while excluding others.

And it does so

in virtue of the type of discourse which it is--in virtue,
that is, of the set of conceptual relations peculiar to it.
As

Wittgenstein says:
Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expression of our interests, and direct our interests.I

Neurophysiological discourse gives rise to other kinds of
questions and excludes certain kinds of answers which
sensation-discourse permits.

Would not, then, the elimina-

tion of sensation-discourse impoverish our understanding

1 Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe
{New York: Macmillw"l, 1953), sec. 570.
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of ourselves and the world?

Rorty does not think so.

Talk

about "quantity of caloric fluid" is also associated with
certain kinds of questions and permissible answers which
are out of place in talk about "mean kinetic energy of molecules."

But the rejection of these kinds of questions and

answers has not diminished but, on the contrary, enhanced
our understanding of the world.

Again, talk about demons

is associated with certain kinds of questions and permissible
answers which are out of place in talk about germs and hallucinations.

Yet, we are none the poorer for having allowed

demon-discourse to fall into desuetude.

Why should sensa-

tion-discourse be thought to occupy a privileged position,
immune to the kinds of criticism which led to the elimination of demon-discourse and talk about "quantity of caloric
fluid?"

One question sometimes deserves another.

What is

our justification for replacing talk about "quantity of
caloric fluid" with talk about "mean kinetic energy of
molecules," demon-discourse with talk about germs and
hallucinations?

Rorty's answer is simplicity and the fact

that all the predictive and explanatory advantages of modern science are retained.

Now the standards of justifica-

tion appropriate to modern science may indeed be relevant
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to the evaluation of these two kinds of discourse, but why
should these standards be thought to have the sort of magisterial neutrality which gives one the right to employ them
in evaluating any discourse whatever?

If the notion that

there is no such thing as pre-linguistic awareness means anything at all, it means at least that there is no such neutral
point from which one can evaluate the different sets of conceptual relations, or logical spaces, which make up the conceptual scheme embedded in the way we talk.

Wittgenstein

remarks:
How is the word 'justification' used? Describe language-games. From these you will also be able to see
the importance of being justified.l
Again, he says:
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we
ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon.'
That is, where we ought to have said: this languagegame is played.2
The problem of justification, I think, is the most serious
one which Rorty's version of the Identity Theory has to
It is a problem about which I will have a great deal

face.

1

Ibid., sec. 486.

2 Ibid., sec. 654.
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more to say in later chapters.

Rorty is not unaware of this

problem and offers by way of solution a general theory of
the conditions under which a term may cease to have a re£erring use.

This theory, however, as I will argue in Chap-

ter II, has no legitimate application in the case of sensation-terms.

The reason why it lacks such an application is

connected with a second problem.

Identity Theorists are

right, I believe, to reject the view that it cannot make
sense to assert that empirical inquiry will discover that
sensations are identical with certain brain processes unless
it also makes sense to assert that empirical inquiry will
discover that other mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions, and attitudes, are identical
with certain brain processes.

For many reasons, it is

implausible to maintain that mental states such as these
are identical with brain processes.

This does not mean,

of course, that materialism must inevitably come to shipwreck over such mental states, for there are good reasons for
thinking that they will eventually submit to behavioristic
explanations (although there are also good reasons for
thinking that they will not).
highly_diverse lot and should

Mental states comprise a
all be expected to fall
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under one type of explanation.

But it does not follow from

their diverse character that they are not in any sense logically connected with one another.

I accept P. F. Strawson's

view that "the topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected subjects. 111

Each type of mental state is inextrica-

bly bound up with the others, interwoven with them.

I also

hold, as do Strawson and even Rorty, that the connection between them is in some sense logical.

Given this view of the

mind, which is shared both by defenders of Eliminative Materialism and their "linguistic" opponents, it ought to be
asked what effect the elimination of sensation-discourse
would have on other types of mental discourse.

If the elim-

ination of sensation-discourse would make significant parts
of other commonly employed types of mental discourse unintelligible, then this at least would be an important disanalogy between such elimination and the elimination of
demon-discourse or discourse employing the concept of
caloric fluid.

And it is primarily analogies with the

elimination of other types of discourse to which ElimiMaterialists appeal to make out their case.

1 Individuals (Garden City, New York:
1963), p. 109.

This is a

Anchor Books,
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question, however, which has barely been discussed.
reason,

I

believe, is twofold:

The

first, a concentration

on too narrow a range of cases and, second, an uncritical
acceptance of an oversimplified view regarding the nature of
the logical connections between mental states.

By concen-

trating only on cases in which sensation-discourse either
replaces the primitive, natural expressions of sensation,
such as crying or grimacing, or explains them, the connection of sensation-discourse with other types of discourse-in particular, discourse in terms of desires, intentions,
and attitudes--has been overlooked.

As Wittgenstein points

out:
We surely do not always say someone is complaining,
because he is in pain. So the words 'I am in pain'
may be a cry of complaint, and may be something else. 1
Sensation-discourse is employed in the explanation of a
whole range of human actions, respecting many of which explanation in wholly physiological terms or even physiological-cum-behavioristic terms would be singularly inappropriate.

This is a point I try to bring out in Chapter II.

If,

however, the logical connections between mental states were

1

2£·

cit., p. 189.
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of the nature of linguistic conventions easily modifiable
in light of future scientific advances, as Rorty holds, the
elimination of sensation-discourse need not make unintelligible significant parts of these other types of discourse.
Now I would agree that the logical connections between mental
states are based on contingent facts.

But it does not fol-

low from this that these connections are contingent on the
state of empirical inquiry.

In Chapter III, I argue that

the contingent facts underlying the connection between pain
and wanting are such that the elimination of that part of
sensation-discourse employing the concept of pain would make
unintelligible a significant part of discourse employing the
concept of wanting.

With respect to the suggestion that it

might be possible also to eliminate the latter type of discourse, I try to show that its elimination would make unintelligible a significant part of discourse employing the
concept of intention and, further, that there is a logical
absurdity in the idea that the existence of intentiondiscourse is contingent on the state of empirical inquiry.
That such consequences would follow from the elimination
of sensation-discourse would not be enough to show that the
latter could not be eliminated, however, if it were the
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case either that that part of wanting-discourse or that part
of intention-discourse which would thereby become unintelligible could also be eliminated without affecting the rest
of these types of discourse.

But the parts of wanting-

discourse and intention-discourse which would be affected
are exceedingly conunon and exceedingly important.

For it is

in their terms and only in their terms that a great variety
of human actions--actions of the kind I discuss in Chapter
II--become intelligible.

In view of the extensive range of

human phenomena which these parts of wanting-discourse and
intention-discourse explain, therefore, it is doubtful whether they could be eliminated without thereby radically affecting the rest of these types of discourse and hence even our
present concept of a person.

That such radical changes would

follow upon the elimination of sensation-discourse constitutes,
I believe, an important disanalogy between such elimination
and the elimination of demon-discourse or discourse employing the concept of caloric fluid and casts serious doubt
on the claim that the logical connections between mental
states--at the very least, the logical connections between
sensations, desires, and intentions implied in those parts
of

wan~ing-discourse

and intention-discourse which the
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elimination of sensation-discourse would make unintelligible--are contingent on the state of empirical inquiry.
Now if the logical connections between these mental
states are not contingent on the state of empirical inquiry,
this has important consequences for a third problem facing
Eliminative Materialism and, in general, the Identity Theory.

This is the problem of incorrigibility, which has re-

ceived considerable attention in recent literature.

It is

maintained by opponents of the Identity Theory that firstperson present-tense sensation statements are incorrigible
in a sense in which physiological statements cannot be incorrigible and that this shows that physiological statements
could not in principle replace sensation statements but
could at most provide only evidence for their truth.

Iden-

tity Theorists have sought to meet this objection either by
challenging the significance of incorrigibility in the
sense in which it cannot be a feature of physiological statements or by trying to show that it would be reasonable

in

the light of future scientific advances to eliminate this
feature.

In Chapter IV, I consider the major arguments

which have been offered against the significance of
incorrigibility for the Identity Theory and argue that they

22
fall short of their goal.

Arguments on which Identity Theor-

ists tend most to rely in support of the claim that it would
be reasonable in the light of future scientific advances to
eliminate incorrigibility are versions of what has come to be
called the electroencephalogram (EEG} argument.
this claim in Chapter V.

I take up

I argue there (1) that the EEG

argument does not show this claim to be true and {2) that
no merely empirical argument can show this claim to be
true.

In my argument for {2) I contend that the logical

connections between sensations, desires, and intentions implied in those parts of wanting-discourse and intentiondiscourse which explain actions of the kind I discuss in
Chapter II are dependent on the feature of incorrigibility
and, hence, that this feature is not contingent on the state
of empirical inquiry since these connections are not.

CHAPTER II
LAWS AND SENSATIONS

Eliminative materialism claims that there are no such
things as sensations.

This claim is intuitively implausi-

ble, because it seems to imply that people who report sensations hold false beliefs.

Proponents of eliminative mate-

rialism either accept this consequence and try to explain
away its implausibility by assimilating the ordinary language
of sensations to an all-pervasive scientific theory or else
argue that the claim that there are no such things as sensations does not have this consequence and try to account for
its intuitive implausibility in some other way, e.g., the
practical inconvenience of eliminating sensation talk.
Feyerabend, for example, adopts the first approach and
argues that the reason it sounds so implausible to say that
people who report sensations hold false beliefs is that the
beliefs to which talk about sensations commits one are part
of a theory so pervasive that many facts with which one
might seek to compare the theory in order to test it are
formulated in terms of the theory and therefore already

23
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prejudiced in its favor. 1

This approach, I think, does

not remove the implausibility but merely serves to shift it
from the alleged consequences of the claim that there are
no such things as sensations to what seem to be consequences of the claim that sensations are theoretical constructs.

One consequence which seems to follow from the

latter claim, for example, is that we do not directly experience sensations.

For something is a theoretical construct

only if we do not directly experience it.

But sensation-

terms are clear cases of terms used to report what we direct.
2
1 y experience.

Another consequence of making sensations

into theoretical constructs is that statements expressed
by sentences such as
(1)

I have a toothache

would seem to commit those who assert them to the statement
expressed by
(2)

There are pains

in the same way that statements expressed by sentences such
as
1 see "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," Review
of Metaphysics, vol. 17 (1963), pp. 50-53.
2 For the development of this objection, see James W.
Cornman, 11 Mental Terms Theoretical Terms, and Materialism,"
Philosophy of Science, XXXV (1968), 45-63.
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(3)

Those tracks (on the glass surface of a Wilson

Cloud Chamber) were made by electrons
commit those who assert them to the statement expressed by
(4)

There are electrons.

But the move from (1) to (2) is just not on a par with the
move from (3) to (4).

A statement requires circumstances.

(1) expresses the statement that I have a toothache only
in certain circumstances.
uttered (1),
statement?

Suppose a stranger came up to me,

and then quickly walked away.
What statement?

Did he make a

Was he a foreigner who did not

know the language and thought that (1) expressed a warning
to watch out for the open manhole I was approaching?

Did

he mistake me for an accomplice to whom he wanted to relay
an important message in code?

Was he a motorist whose new

car had just broken down again and who in exasperation
wanted to tell the first person he met that he had a "lemon,"
but thought that (1) would be a better expression for conveying what he wanted to say?

It might be objected that

the stranger, at least, knew what he meant by uttering (1),
and this is sufficient for (l)'s having been used to make a
statement.

But can a person make a statement if he is

addressing someone who does not understand what he means?

26

He can try to make a statement.

A person often searches for

"the right words," using first one form of expression and
then another until he hits upon one which enables him to
say what he has been trying to say.

He succeeds in saying

what he has been trying to say only when the person or persons (or, at least, some of them) whom he is addressing come
to understand what he means. 1

That a person cannot make a

'
statement unless those whom he is
addressing are capable

of understanding what he means is even clearer.
son talk to a drapery hook?
drapery hook?

Can a per-

Can he even try to talk to a

He can, of course, go through the motions--he

can utter words while in its presence.

I am not saying that

there must always be someone else whom a person is addressing
if he is to succeed in making a statement.
to himself, tell himself things.

A person can talk

But this consideration is

irrelevant to the question of whether the stranger who, in
my example, came up to me and uttered (1) had succeeded

1 rt might be thought that a person can succeed in making a statement if someone who overhears his words understands what he means even though the person or persons addressed do not. But it is more natural to describe this
case as one in which the overhearer knows what the speaker
is trying to say rather than what the speaker is saying.
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in making a statement.

For he was not telling himself that

he had a toothache.
Now the circumstances in which (1) can be used to
state that I have a toothache are not circumstances in which
(2) can be used to make a statement.

If I had been acting

irritably, or turned down an invitation, or made an appointment with the dentist, I could use (1) to inform someone who
wondered what was up that I had a toothache.

But in these

circumstances, to what question could (2) be used to give an
answer?
vey?

What possible information could (2) be used to con-

In the circumstances of ordinary life where (1) has

its home, (2) has no use.

Indeed, if someone were to come

up to me and utter (2) outside a philosophical context, I
would be at a loss as to what he meant.

If this is true,

however, then I do not see how it can be maintained that
statements expressed by sentences such as (1) commit those
who assert them to the statement expressed by (2).

If (2)

fails to express a statement in the circumstances in which
(1) succeeds in expressing the statement that I have a toothache, it would seem that the use of (1) carries with it no
such existential commitment.

Or if it does, this would at

the very least be a queer sort of commitment.

Such queerness,
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however, does not affect the transition from (3) to (4).
I think it is plain.that the circumstances in which (3)
can be used to state that those tracks were made by electrons are circumstances in which (4) also has a use.

In-

deed, one could easily imagine a discussion between adherents of the corpuscular interpretation of quantum physics
and adherents of the wave interpretation in which both
(3) and (4) were used to make statements.
It may be objected to the foregoing that statements
expressed by sentences such as {l) must carry with them
existential commitment regarding pains.

If the words "a

toothache" in {l) were not used in such a way that they purport to designate an object distinct from the person uttering (1), there would be nothing for {l) to be about and
hence it would be meaningless.

But this is not true.

Consider the sentence
{5)

The grocer had a glimpse of the man who stole

Smith's wallet.
(5) does not express a statement about the man who stole
Smith's wallet, but about the grocer's glimpse of this man.
Now clearly it is implausible to say that (5) commits the
person uttering it to a belief in the existence of glimpses.
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The v.-ords "a glimpse" need not ostensibly refer to an object
distinct from the grocer in order that there be something
for (5) to be about.

The genitive inflection in the phrase

"the grocer's glimpse" does not signify the relation of belonging to, as it does in the phrase, "the grocer's apron,"
but rather the manner in which the grocer saw the man who
stole Smith's wallet. 1
(g~) (g~) (a~) (~

The proper analysis of (5) is not

is the grocer &

~

is the man who stole

Smith's wallet & z is a glimpse of

~

& x had

~)

1 It may be said that although the grocer does not
have a glimpse in the same sense in which he has an apron,
it does not follow that the gentive inflection in the phrase
"the grocer's glimpse" does not signify the relation of belonging to. It could be that the grocer has a glimpse only
in virtue of having something else, viz., an act of seeing,
in the sense in which he has an apron. But this suggestion
is implausible for two reasons. First, there is no ordi~
nary sense of the expressions "having," "possessing," and
"belonging to" in which it makes sense to speak of "having
an act of seeing" or "possessing an act of seeing" or
"an act of seeing belonging to someone." It is true that
these former expressions can be given a sense which make
these latter expressions meaningful. Since, however, it
does make sense to speak of "having an apron" or "possessing
an apron" or "an apron belonging to someone" in the ordinary sense of "having," "possessing," and "belonging to,"
it follows that the given sense of these latter expressions
would not be the sense in which the grocer has an apron.
Second, the grocer has an apron in a sense in which it is
possible for the apron not to belong to anyone at all. But
it is implausible to maintain that the grocer can "have"
an act of seeing in a sense in which it is possible for the
act of seeing not to belong to anyone at all. These remarks
apply mutatis mutandis to the expressions "having a toothache" and 11 feeITng nauseous" which I assimilate in the
text to "having a glimpse."
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but rather
(~x) (~~) (~

is the grocer & ~ is the man who stole

Smith's wallet & x

saw~

fleetingly).

Analogously, it is quite possible that the proper analysis
of sentences such as (1) will assimilate them to sentences
such as
(6)

I am feeling nauseous.

The expression "have a toothache" on such an analysis will
not be further analyzable and will serve merely to characterize a way of being conscious.
Rorty avoids these difficulties connected with Feyerabend' s version of eliminative materialism by maintaining
that words for sensations are observation-terms, although,
indeed, he insists that "the distinction between observation-terms and non-observation-terms is relative to linguistic practices (practices which may change as inquiry
progresses)

On this position, however, there

seems to be no way of reconciling the intuitive implausibility of saying that people who report sensations hold
false beliefs with the claim that there are no such things

111 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," p. 40.

...
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as sensations.

To claim that there are no such things as

that to which an observation-term purports to refer seems
to imply that people who report them hold false beliefs.
Thus, for example, to claim that there are no unicorns
seems to imply that people who say such things as "I chased
a unicorn out of my clover-patch yesterday" hold false beliefs.

Accordingly, Rorty argues that this implication does

not hold with respect to sensations.

His argument consists

in sketching a general theory of the conditions under which
such an implication does not hold.

The theory-sketch is

this.
(1) X's are the subjects of both inferential and noninferential reports; (2) empirical discoveries are
made which enable us to subsume X-laws under Y-laws
and to produce new X-laws by studying Y's; (3) inferential reports of X1 s cease to be madeT (4) non-inferential reports of X's are reinterpreted either (4a) as
reports of Y's, or (4b) as reports of mental entities
(thoughts that one is seeing an X, hallucinatory images,
etc.); (5) non-inferential reports of X's cease to be
made (because their place is taken by non-inferential
reports either of Y's or of thoughts, hallucinatory
images, etc.); (6)-we conclude that there simply are
no such things as X's.l
I want to begin my discussion of Rorty's version of eliminative materialism with an examination of this theory.
particular, I want to examine stage (2) of the theory.

1 rbid., pp. 35-36.

In
For
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stage (2) to have an application to the case of sensations,
there must be such things as sensation-laws which occur
essentially in sensation-explanations.
tion-laws?

But what are sensa-

It is worthy of note that Rorty does not provide

us with any examples of such laws.

In fact, there is a

marked scarcity of such examples in recent materialist literature.

Scientific materialists should find this scarcity em-

barrassing, since it only serves to strengthen the conviction of their opponents that sensation-statements play a different role in our lives, have a different use, than do
neurophysiological statements and hence that sensation-laws,
if there are such, are not statements of a type which can
be subsumed under neurophysiological laws.
To clear up this question, it will be useful to call to
mind the sorts of things which go under the heading of "sensations."

Besides pain, there are the sorts of things which

make up the well-known list assembled by Gilbert Ryle in
The Concept of Mind: 1

thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs,

wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms,
hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings and

1 (New York:

Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 83-84.
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shocks.

Now what does a throb-law look like?

think of any.

I cannot

Is this because throb-laws are so terribly

complicated that no one has yet been able to formulate one
of them with sufficient precision?

But then how is it possi-

ble for them to occur essentially in explanations which even
the most untutored persons can understand, as when someone
asks me why I shook my head like that and I say that I felt
a sudden throbbing in my right ear?

Or is it that throb-

laws are so terribly obvious that no one has yet bothered
to formulate one of them?
up one.

Then it ought to be easy to think

Here is a candidate.

(L.l)

Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in his
ear will shake his head in such-and-such a
manner.

The trouble with this candidate is that it is false.
son might rub his ear instead.

A per-

Suppose we replace (L.1)

by a slightly more complicated candidate.
(L.2)

Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in his
ear and thinks that shaking his head in suchand-such a manner will be the best way to remove
it, will shake his head in such-and-such a manner.
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The trouble with (L.2} is that it seems to be restricted
to cases in which the sufferer deliberates over a number of
possibilities until he decides upon one and then carries
out his decision.
happens.

But in most cases nothing of the sort

In fact, in most cases of a person's shaking his

head because of a throbbing in his ear, the person is not
thinking of anything at all, or, at least, not of anything
related to the throbbing.
shakes his head.

He feels the throbbing and just

There are some cases, indeed, in which

the person is so engrossed in what he is doing, as when he is
playing chess, that he does not realize that he has shaken
his head until someone asks him why he has.

Suppose now

that instead of replacing (L.l} by a more complicated candidate, we replace it by one that is more general.
(.L.3}

Anyone who feels an unpleasant throbbing in
his ear will tend to do whatever is conducive
to removing it.

The objection to (L.3} is that it could not possibly be
true.

For there are many different and incompatible things

conducive to removing an unpleasant throbbing in the ear.
Perhaps the
(L. 4)

followi~g

will do:

J>...nyone who feels cm unpleasant throbbing in
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his ear will tend to do something conducive
to removing it.
But (L.4) does not explain why the person shook his head
rather than, say, rub his ear.

The reason why throb-laws

are so hard to find is not that they are too obvious for
anyone to have thought it worth the effort to formulate
them.
The same considerations apply mutatis.mutandis to panglaws, pricking-laws, curdling-laws, etc.

Of the sensations

which make up Ryle's list, itches seem to be least objectionable as subjects of possible laws.

When someone asks

me why I am rubbing my nose and I reply that I have an
itch, it seems not too implausible to say that my reply
serves as an explanation only if it makes a tacit appeal
to some such law as
(L.5)

People who have itches tend to scratch the
place that itches.

I think, however, that the case for the essential occurrence of itch-laws in itch-explanations stands or falls
with the case for the essential occurrence of other sorts
of sensation-laws in sensation-explanations.

The sensation-

explanations for which it is most plausible to claim a
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tacit appeal to sensation-laws are pain-explanations.

This

is no doubt one of the reasons why pains have received so
much attention in recent materialist literature.

Itches

seem to stand somewhere between throbs and pangs on the one
hand and pains on the other in an ascending order of plausible candidates for subjects of possible laws.

The considera-

tions which weigh in favor of pains would serve, I think,
to balance the considerations deriving from throbs and pangs
which weigh against itches.

For this reason I want to turn

now to pains.
To the best of my knowledge, materialists have given
only one explicit example of what is supposed to count as
a pain-law.
(L.6)

The example is this.
People tend to avoid things with which they have
had painful experiences. 1

A few other examples have been suggested.

These are all of

the following sort.
(L. 7)

People in pain tend to cry out. 2

1 see Hilary Putnam, "Minds and Machines," in Sidney
Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind (New York: New York University Press, 1960), p. 171.~~
2 The expression "cry out" is not meant to be restricted only to the cries, say, of a child, but includes
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(L.8)

People in pain tend to grimace.

(L.6), (L.7), and (L.8) have a suspicious look about them
which makes it doubtful whether they are statements of a
kind that can be subsumed under neurophysiological laws. 1
Before I explore this point, however, I want to call attention to the richness of

pain~explanations,

consequent upon

the very important role they play in our lives, and to the
'
corresponding failure of this handful
of examples adequately

to represent the full range of pain-laws which, on the present view, would have to be postulated.

Consider the follow-

ing examples of pain-explanations:
(E.l)

He said that he felt bad because he was hilllgry
and had a headache. 2

(E.2)

I declined the invitation because I had a headache.

within its range of application groans and exclamations such
as "Ouch!" and "Oh, how my head hurts!"
1 Rorty never explains anywhere what he means by the subsumption of one set of laws under another set of laws. I
think it is clear, however, that he means at least that the
subsumed laws are less basic or fundamental than the laws
under which they are subsumed, in the sense that the former
are dependent on the latter.
2

This example is Putnam's.

See ibid., p. 170.
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(E.3)

I won't be at the chess tournament tonight because I have a headache.

(E.4)

I expected to pass out any minute because of the
pain.

(E.5)

I finally promised her that I would hire someone
to help me, because the pain involved in moving
about continued to get worse.

(E.6)

His constant suffering wouldn't let me forget
my guilt.

(E.7)

I prayed to God to end my life then, because I
could no longer endure the suffering.

(E.8)

I gave him permission to amputate the foot because I could bear the pain no longer.

(E.9)

I ordered him to amputate the foot because of
the pain I was in.

(E.10)

I sold my business because I was in too much pain
to work any longer.

(E.11)

I finally married her, because the pain prevented me from taking care of myself.

Now it might be thought that no further laws need be postulated for (E.1-11) than {L.6) or those irnrneqiately derivable from (L.6).

But, firstt this is clearly not the case
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for (E.4-6).

Expecting to pass out any minute is not a way

of avoiding painful experiences, although passing out is.
Similarly, promising her that I would hire someone is not
a way of avoiding painful experiences, although hiring someone is.

And remembering my guilt is not a way of avoiding

his pain or the pain I feel at his suffering.

Even (E.l)

seems to be an explanation to which (L.6) is irrelevant.

One's

saying that he felt bad is not a' way of avoiding his hunger
and headache.

Nor is (L.7) relevant to (E.l) in most cases.

One's saying that he felt bad can sometimes be assimilated
to the cry "Oh, how my head hurts!," but not always.
Second, since pain-laws, on the present view, are statements of a kind which can be subsumed under neurophysiological laws, the expression "avoid things" in (L.6) would have
to be capable of being spelled out in wholly neurophysiological terms.

But no statement or set of statements wholly in

neurophysiological terms would be sufficient to explain the
occurrence of the acts of avoidance in (E.8-11).

Giving

permission involves more than just saying "you may • • •
A child or a madman can say "You may amputate my foot," but
the person to whom this is said does not thereby have the
right to amputate.

Or even a normal adult can say this to

"
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someone whom he mistakenly believes to be a licensed physician, but it is clearly false that the person to whom this
is said has been granted permission to amputate.

A person

can grant someone permission to amputate only if the former
is legally of age and has not been judged legally insane, and
the latter has been licensed to perform operations by a governmental agency authorized to issue such licenses.

To ex-

plain satisfactorily the occurrence of the act of avoidance
in (E.8), therefore, the relevant pain-law would have to be
capable of expansion into a statement which mentions such
things as laws, customs, practices, authority, institutions,
and, in general, an organized community.

But it is difficult

to see how these sorts of things could be spelled out in
wholly neurophysiological terms.

How, for example, could

the law that people become responsible for their actions at
the age of 21 consist in "the firing of C-fibers?"
considerations apply to (E.9-11).

Analogous

I cannot order someone

to do something unless I am in a position of authority.

A

ship's-captain who has just been wounded can order a ship'sdoctor to amputate his foot, but a petty officer cannot.
Now how could the authority to order the ship's-doctor to
amputate one's foot be a discharge of neurons or consist in

41

the firing of C-fibers?

Further, to be in such a position

of authority presupposes the existence of military laws and
institutions, which would, accordingly, also have to be capable of expression in wholly neurophysiological terms.

Again,

selling one's business involves more than just accepting some
pieces of metal and paper and then walking away.

The act of

avoidance mentioned in (E.10) essentially involves the notions
But a 'piece of paper with writing

of a contract and money.

on it is not a contract outside an organized community in
which there are laws, government, etc.

And pieces of metal

and paper are not money apart from the existence of financial
institutions.

That (E.11) does not differ in this respect

from (E.8-10) is obvious; marrying someone involves more
than merely saying

11

I do.

11

So far I have been concentrating on explanations which
presuppose the existence of a social community with its rules,
customs, and institutions.

It would not be difficult, how-

ever, to extend these remarks to explanations which presuppose the existence of a moral or religious community.
sider, for example, (E. 5-7).

Con-

(E.5) and (E.6) are explana-

tions, as I have pointed out above, to which (L.6) is irrelevant. It does not follow, of course, that they are
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explanations to which no pain-laws would be relevant.

But

any statement which might plausibly be claimed to be a
pain-law occurring essentially in (E.5) or (E.6) would have
to be capable of expansion into a statement which mentioned
moral responsibility and moral rules, duties, and rights.
To explain the memory of my guilt, for example, is not just
to explain the memory of his suffering or even the memory
of having injured him.

Similarly, praying to God involves

more than just saying "Please, dear God, • ·• • • 11

Even a

savage can be trained to say these words, but is he then
praying?

I

am not saying that savages cannot pray, or even

that they do not pray.

Nor am

I

saying that some of the ex-

pressions they employ in the course of praying cannot be
translated into the words "Please, dear God,

II

But

should we happen upon someone belonging to a tribe unacquainted with any form of worship and train him to say these
words and to perform all the appropriate physical movements
and even have all the appropriate mental accompaniments, we
would still not have the right to say that he was praying.
.
. a custom ( a use, an ins
. t"t
. ) •1
Praying
is
i ution

One might

1 cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, secs.
199-200.
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grant that a statement or set of statements wholly in neurophysiological terms would be sufficient to explain the occurrence of the act of saying, "Please, dear God •

II

but how could such a statement or statements explain the
existence of the custom of saying these words?
. grant even this much?

And need one

Saying, "Please, dear God, •

volves more than just uttering certain noises.

...

" in-

Uttering

these noises is saying something only if a place is already
prepared for them in a language, and language is essentially
interwoven with shared activities and presupposes agreement
.
in
1"t s use. 1

In short, saying something presupposes the

existence of an organized community.

This point about the

nature of language has a significance which extends beyond
(E.7).

It shows that the claim that there is a statement or

set of statements in wholly neurophysiological terms sufficient to account for the occurrence of the event explained
in (E.l) is vulnerable to the same sorts of objections which
have just been raised in connection with (E.5-11), and even
casts doubt on analogous claims vis-a-vis (E.3} and (E.4).
(E.3} is not a prediction but a statement of intention.
1 ct. ibid., secs. 241-42.
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I am not predicting that I won't be at the chess tournament
tonight because I observe that I have a headache and remember that whenever I had a headache in the past I stayed home.
Now what is it like for me to intend not to be there tonight?
Perhaps I say to myself or someone else, "I'll not go."
I imagine myself there tonight and shake my head.

Or

Or I do

not think about it at all but just stay home or go elsewhere.
But intending not to be at the chess tournament tonight involves more than just uttering these words or shaking my
head while imagining myself there or staying home.

Not being

there is the fulfillment of intending not to be there,
but it is not the fulfillment of these events.

It is not

clear whether it even makes sense to speak of these events
as having a fulfillment.

To try to avoid this objection by

pushing the intention back from these events to the brain
processes which are their causes would be futile.

For speak-

ing of a brain process as having been fulfilled would seem
to make sense only if it is another way of saying that the
brain process has been completed.

It is in language that

uttering these words or shaking my head while imagining
myself there or stating home makes contact with not being
there.

In any case, intending not to be at the chess
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tournament tonight presupposes the existence of the technique of the game of chess; and this in turn presupposes
the existence of the custom of playing games.
is it like for me to expect to pass out?
think I'm going to pass out."

Again, what

I say perhaps "I

Or I simply grab hold of the

nearest chair to steady myself.

These events or even their

neurophysiological causes are not my expectation of passing
out, however, for passing out fulfills the latter but (logically) cannot fulfill the former.

Only in language do these

events and passing out make contact.

It seems, therefore,

that none of the events explained in (E.1-11) are such that
statements in wholly neurophysiological terms would be suf ficient to explain their occurrence.
fer in this respect is plain.

That (E.2) does not dif-

I cannot decline an invita-

tion unless there is the custom of extending and accepting
invitations.
I have been arguing so far that, on the view that there
are pain-laws occurring essentially in pain-explanations,
the pain-laws which would have to be postulated to do justice to the richness of pain-explanations in ordinary life
would have to be capable of expansion into

~tatements

which

mentioned such things as laws, customs, practices, authority,
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institutions, and, in general, an organized community.

My

purpose has been to cast doubt on the idea that such laws
would be statements of a kind which can be subsumed under
neurophysiological laws.

Now it might be maintained that al-

though these pain-laws would be difficult to analyze in
wholly neurophysiological terms, to do so would in principle
be possible and this is all that the present view really requires.

But, first, in view of this difficulty, the burden

of proof would seem to be on the materialist to show that it
is in principle possible to analyze such things as laws, customs, etc., in neurophysiological terms.

A few examples, of

even the most elementary sort, would be helpful; yet none
seem to be forthcoming.

Second, there is some reason to think

that such an analysis would not be possible even in principle.
I have in mind the essential vagueness of the events commonly
explained in pain-explanations.

If promising, ordering,

giving permission, etc., were in principle analyzable into
neurophysiological processes, then, since the latter either
occur or do not occur, the former would either occur or not
occur.

But the law of excluded middle does not seem to ap-

ply to the occurrence of the former events •. Consider promises, for example.

The promise mentioned in (E.5) could
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have been given in a form of words prefixed by "I promise"
but need not have been.
11

All that might have been said was

0kay, I'll hire someone. 11

expression of a promise?

Now what made these words the
The situation and its antecedents--

the whole history of the incident.

But the situation could

have left it open which way these words were to be taken.
(Cf. breach of promise suits which call for a decision by the
court.)

Even when the "I promise" formula is used, it is

sometimes not clear whether a promise has been given.
pose I say, "I promise • • •
pain.

Did I promise?

transitional cases.

11

Sup-

when I am out of my head with

No one would say so.

But there are

At what point can one say, "It is

exactly here, at this degree of suffering, that these words
no longer count as the expression of a promise?"

It is easy

to see how these remarks apply to each one of the events explained in (E.1-11).

Have I given permission to amputate

my foot if I say, "Go ahead" when I am delirious with pain?
At what point do I not do so?

Marriage in some places is

effected by cohabiting, but after exactly how much time--in
days, minutes, and seconds?

A captain can order a lieuten-

ant to do something--but when they are both.prisoners of
w·ar?

Here, regulations had to be devised in order to

decid~
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the question.

Is it mutiny when the crew refuses the crazed

captain's demand to turn their guns on ships of their own
fleet?

Do I

~

that I feel bad if I mumble the words, "I

feel bad" while in deep sleep?

None of these questions would

call for decisions if the events mentioned were analyzable in
principle into neurophysiological processes but rather for
further research--for further observation and experiment.
I want to turn now from the sorts of laws which would
have to be postulated to explain the occurrence of the events
explained in (E.1-11) to the relatively simple laws (L.6-8).
These laws, as I mentioned earlier, have a suspicious look
about them which makes it doubtful whether they are statements of a kind that can be subsumed under neurophysiological
laws.

The feature to which I refer is that they all appear

to be a priori propositions.

If {L.6-8) are a priori proposi-

tions, then, since neurophysiological laws are contingent
propositions, (L.6-8) cannot be dependent on such laws. 1
A priori propositions express connections which cannot be
confirmed or refuted by experience (although some a priori
propositions, e.g., "Demons are intangible," can be shown

1

Cf. supra, p. 37, n. 1.
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to have no application to experience) and, hence, which cannot be dependent on correlations expressed by contingent
laws.

Consider (L.6), for example.

(L.6) is true a priori,

not because of its form but because of its meaning--that is,
because of the connection between the concept of pain and
avoidance-behavior. 1

Thus, (L.6) is true a priori, not

1 The propositions (1) "No unmarried man is married" and
(2) "No bachelor is married" are both true a priori propositions, that is, true propositions not open to confirmation
or refutation by experience.
(1), however, is true by virtue of its form alone, while (2) is true by virtue of the
meaning of its non-logical terms. Thus (1) is a substitution instance of the tautologous propositional form "No nonA is A," while the propositional form of which (2) is an instance, viz., "No A is B," is not tautologous. The tautologousness of "No non-A is A" resides in its property of having only true substitution instances, a property which "No
A is B" clearly lacks. To put the same point differently,
Tl) is true and remains true under any and all reinterpretations of its non-logical terms; (2), however, although
true, does not remain true under any and all reinterpretations of its non-logical terms. Now just as (2) is true by
virtue of the meaning of its non-logical terms, (L.6) is also true by virtue of the meaning of its non-logical terms.
But the truth of (L.6) does not depend on the meaning of its
non-logical terms in the same way that (2) does. The truth
of (2) depends on the relation of cognitive synonymy, which
may for present purposes be explicated as follows: "A" and
"B" are cognitively synonymous if and only if necessarily
all and only those things of which "A" is truly predicable
are things of which "B" is truly predicable. Now it is not
true that necessarily-all and only those. things of which
"pain" is truly predicable are things of which "avoidancebehavior" is truly predicable, especially if it be thought
sensible (which I doubt) to predicate "pain" of threedimensional "time slices" of four-dimensional space-time
entities. The meaning-relation on which the truth of (L.6)
depends is much more complicated. Let "meaning-relationL.6"
stand for this meaning-relation. Then, crudely formulated, meaning-relationL. 6 is as follows:
~" and "B" are
meaning-relatedL 6 if and only if necessarily there are some things
of which "A" is "(truly or falsely) predicable only if most
11
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because it remains true under any and all

reinterpreta~ions

of its non-logical terms, but because if someone in normal
circumstances (that is, not while rehearsing a play, under
hypnosis, drugged, etc.) were sincerely to self-apply the
word "pain" or one of its cognates in the absence of appropriate simultaneous or subsequent avoidance-behavior, it
would not be clear what he was using this word to mean.

If

someone in normal circumstances 'were sincerely to utter the
words "My foot is very sore," for example, but showed no
fear of or made no objection to an inconsiderate handling
of his foot, it would be difficult to guess what he could
mean.

We could, of course, test his knm-lledge of the lan-

guage--and even find out that he was using these words correctly.

This would be a case, then, in which pain did occur

in the absence of simultaneous or subsequent avoidancebehavior.

But how would we find out that he was using

these words correctly?

That he is able to define "sore" in

terms of "pain" or its other cognates would not be helpful,

things of which "A" is truly predicable are things of which
11
B" is truly predicable. The notion of necessity employed
here is not that of logical entailment. I try to explicate
this notion as well as refine the foregoing crude formulation of meaning-relationL.G in Chapter III.
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for what we would want to know is whether he understood the
meaning of any of these terms.

The only way of finding this

out, it seems, would be to observe his application of these
words in circumstances in which either he or someone else
is exhibiting the appropriate avoidance-behavior. 1
although any proposition of the form

"~

Thus

is in pain but does

not and will not exhibit avoidance-behavior" is open to confirmation or refutation by experience and, hence, is a contingent proposition, "pain" and its cognates presuppose the
existence of circumstances in which pain occurs together with
simultaneous or subsequent avoidance-behavior for their meaning.

The concept of pain, that is, presupposes the exis-

tence of such circumstances.
To the foregoing it might be objected, as it has been, 2
that one need not observe how someone applies a word in
paradigm cases to find out whether he understands its
meaning; it would be possible, at least in principle, to find

1 The avoidance-behavior would not be appropriate if it
consisted in, say, showing fear of or making objection to an
inconsiderate handling of one's hand.
2 see Hilary Putnam, "Brains and Behavior," in R. J.
Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, II (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1965), pp. 1-19.
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this out by examining (e.g.) his brain processes or the electrical waves emanating from his brain.

The general reply to

this objection has already been anticipated in my previous
remarks about the nature of language.

The meaning of a word

is determined by the rules governing its use.

But it is

difficult to see how these rules could be brain processes
or electrical waves.

For they presuppose the existence of an

'
organized community, with its laws,
customs, practices, and

institutions.

Further, these rules are essentially vague.

The use of most of our words is never completely determined;
there are always borderline cases which call for decision
rather than for application of the appropriate rule.

But

brain processes or waves are not in this way vague, if, indeed it makes sense to speak of them as being vague at all.
I think this general reply to the objection is sufficient,
but a limited reply can also be made which grants the possibility of finding out whether someone understands the meaning
of a word by examining his brain processes or brain waves.
That certain brain processes or brain waves were evidence
for a_ given person's understanding the meaning of the word
"pain" could be established only by observation of correlations between brain processes or brain waves of the same
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kind belonging to other persons and the presence in them of
such understanding. 1

But then the way of telling whether a

given person understands the meaning of "pain" which consists
in examining his brain processes or brain waves would presuppose the existence of some other way of telling whether a
person understands the meaning of "pain. 112

Now this other

way of telling, it seems, would have either to consist in
observing how a person applies "pain" in circumstances in
which he or someone else is exhibiting the appropriate avoidance-behavior or, at least, ultimately presuppose this way
of telling.

It is important to notice that this limited

reply to the objection under discussion cannot stand alone
but must finally fall back upon considerations relevant to
the general reply.

For a possible rejoinder to the former

1Even Putnam admits this much.

See ibid., pp. 14-17.

2 It does not follow, of course, that this other way of
telling would have to be capable of successful employment
with respect to every person. Thus, the way of telling
whether a given person understands the meaning of "pain"
which consists in examining his brain processes or brain
waves would not presuppose the existence of some other way
of telling whether that person understands the meaning
of "pain." Whatever plausibility Putnam's argument has derives from this consideration. Putnam assumes a community
of "super-super-spartans" with respect to which any other
way of telling could not be successfully employed.
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is that one could conceivably establish that certain brain
processes or brain waves are evidence for a given person's
understanding the meaning of "pain" by observing correlations between brain processes or brain waves of the same
kind and the presence of such understanding in one's own
case.

Thus one might attach some suitable electrical detect-

ing instrument to one's own skull and observe the patterns
it records when one is using the word "pain" to say something.

But surely, the rejoinder continues, I need not ob-

serve how I apply "pain" in circumstances in which I or someone else exhibits the appropriate avoidance-behavior to find
out whether I understand what •:pain" means.

The most effec-

tive way to counter this move, I believe, is to point out
that one knows that one understands the meaning of the word
"pain" only if it is true that one understands it, that is,
only if the concept of understanding the meaning of the word
"pain" truly applies in one's case.

And the range of appli-

cation of a concept is determined by rules governing the use
of the expression for that concept.

Without such rules it

makes no sense either to affirm or deny that a concept truly
applies to a given case.

Now rules of language are essen-

tially interwoven with shared act.jvities made possible by
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agreement in behavior. 1

And particular kinds of rules are

essentially interwoven with shared activities made possible
by agreement in particular kinds of behavior.

Among the par-

ticular kinds of behavior which in fact underlie the activities interwoven with rules governing the use of the expression "understanding the meaning of the word 'pain'" is avoidance-behavior.
Grimacing and crying out while in pain are also part of
the circumstances whose existence is presupposed by the concept of pain.

Thus (L.7) and (L.8) are true a priori in the

same way that (L.6) is.

The former are true a priori, not

because it is impossible for pain to occur in the absence of
. grimacing or crying out, but because if someone in normal
circumstances (that is, not while rehearsing a play, under
hypnosis, drugged, etc.) were sincerely to self-apply the
word "pain" or one of its cognates in the absence of grimacing and crying out, it would not be clear what he was using
this word to mean.

If someone in normal circumstances were

sincerely to utter the words, "I have a headache" or "I

1 c£. Wittgenstein's remark, "If a lion.could talk,
we could not understand him," ~· cit., p. 223.
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have a toothache," for example, but did not exhibit sig-ns
of unusual irritability, it would be difficult to guess what
he could mean.

1

We could, of course, test his knowledge

of the language--and even find out that he was using these
words correctly.

But the way of finding this out, it seems,

would have to consist in observing his application of these
words in circumstances in which he or someone else is grimac\

ing and crying out (as well as exhibiting the appropriate
avoidance-behavior}, or, if one accepts the examination of
his brain processes or brain waves as a possible test, would
have to presuppose the existence of circumstances in which
(at least) someone applied these words while grimacing and
crying out (as well as exhibiting the appropriate avoidancebehavior}.
It will be useful to summarize the general argument of
this chapter.

Most kinds of sensations make implausible

candidates for subjects of possible laws.

The few kinds

1 one can, indeed, sincerely utter these words in the
course of teaching someone else their meaning or by way of
giving an example, say, in a philosophical discussion. But
then one is not self-applying pain-words at all. One is not
using these words to say that one is in pain, because one
is not using them to say anything. In such cases, they are
merely being mentioned.

57
of sensations which do not are such that the laws in which
they might most plausibly be claimed to occur as subjects
either would have to be capable of expansion into statements
which mention such things as laws, customs, practices, authority, institutions, and, in general, an organized community,
or else would be a priori propositions. 1

In either case

it is difficult to see how these laws could be subsumed under
neurophysiological laws.

But if they cannot, then Rorty

has failed to show that the central claim of eliminative materialism, viz. that there are no such things as sensations,
does not have the intuitively implausible consequence that
people who report sensations hold false beliefs.
(2) of the general theory

For stage

he sketches of the conditions

under which such an implication does not hold has no application to the case of sensations.

Further, it does not seem

possible to explain away the implausibility of this consequence, as Feyerabend tries to do, by assimilating the ordinary language of sensations to an all-pervasive scientific
theory.

This approach seems merely to replace the

1 rt should be plain that the argument for the a priori
character of the pain-laws, {L.6-8), applies mutatis mutandis to the itch-law, {L.5).
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implausibility of saying that people who report sensations
hold false beliefs by the implausibility of the consequences
which follow upon such an assimilation.

CHAPTER III
SENSATION-EXPLANATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL REVISION
In my last chapter, I presented a number of examples
to show that sensation-statements play a different role in
our lives, have a different use, than do neurophysiological
statements and drew the consequence that sensation-laws, if
there are such, are not statements of a type which can be
subsumed under neurophysiological laws.

Scientific mate-

rialists could easily grant the soundness of this argument,
however, without sacrificing anything essential to their
position.

As things stand now, they could say, sensation-

statements play a different role than do neurophysiological
statements, and sensation-laws cannot be subsumed under neurophysiological laws.

But the role that a given type of

statement plays is determined by the placed prepared for it
in a conceptual scheme, and conceptual schemes can be revised.

That we do now operate with a conceptual scheme hav-

ing the above features is to be attributed to the present
stage of empirical inquiry.

Should there be significant

. scientific advances of the appropriate sort in the future,
it would be reasonable to revise our conceptual scheme so
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as to eliminate these features.

That Rorty would be prepared

to fall back upon such an argument if he came to doubt the
feasibility of subsuming sensation-laws under neurophysiological laws is clear from the pragmatic strain running through
his many writings on the subject.

He would then still be

left with the problem of showing that the central claim of
eliminative materialism does not have the implausible consequence that people who report sensations hold false beliefs.
In what follows, I propose to examine the claim that it
would be reasonable in the light of future scientific advances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensationstatements in our lives could be taken over by neurophysiological statements.
I want to consider first the nature of the relation between pain and wanting.

Aristotle held that pain and want-

ing are necessarily connected.

In the course of discussing

whether the soul is distinguishable into parts and, if so,
in what sense, he says:
[W]here there is sensation, there is also pleasure and
pain, and, where these, necessarily also desire.l
1

De An. 413b 22-23.
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The notion of necessary connection is notoriously vague
and shot through with difficulties, and it is not at all
clear in this passage what Aristotle has in mind.

From some

of his later remarks it would be reasonable to assume that
he is setting forth a mechanistic theory of what sets a
human being in physical motion.

Such an interpretation would

be warranted by the following passages:
[W]hen the object [of perception] is pleasant or ~ain
ful, the soul • • • pursues or avoids the object.
[T]here is a justification for regarding these two as
the sources of movement, i.e., appetite and practical
thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement
and as a result of that thought gives rise to a movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of
stimulation. So too when the imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite • • • • [M]ind
is never found producing movement without appetite • • • ,
but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite.2
This way of explaining the connection between pain and
wanting is not uncommon in the history of philosophy.
find it, for example, in both Descartes and Hume.

We

Descartes

concludes his Meditations with a crude mechanistic explanation of why "those who when they are sick desire to drink
or eat things hurtful to them. 113

1 oe An. 43la 8-9.

2

Even in sick people, he

De An. 433a 18-26.

3Meditations,. IV, in The Philosophical Works of
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notes, the sensation of thirst causes the desire to drink
which in turn causes the body to be impelled to drink, just
as pain in the foot excites the mind to do its utmost to
remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to
the foot.

Again, in The Passions of the Soul, Descartes

sketches the mechanism whereby anticipation of pain causes
fear which in turn causes the desire to flee which in turn
causes the body to be impelled to flee. 1

Hume offers a simi-

lar account of the relation between pain and wanting.

"'Tis

obvious," he says,
• • • that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure
from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 2, 3
And in another passage:
DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply, and AVERSION

Descartes, trans. Elizabeth s. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross
(2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967),
I, 194 (cited hereafter as the "HR" translation).
1 The Passions of the Soul, I, 35-40 (HR, I, 347-50).
2A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 414.
(cited
hereafter as Treatise).
3 Like Aristotle and Descartes (see The Passions of the
Soul, II, 86-87 (HR, I, 369-70), I am classifying aversion
asa kind of desire; it is a desire to avoid what is painful.
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is deriv'd from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when
either the good or the absence of the evil may be
attain'd by any action of the mind or body.l
Let us call the interpretation of "necessary connection" based on the mechanistic model presented in these passages the "causal interpretation."

To say that pain is neces-

sarily connected with wanting, on this interpretation, is to
say that pain is causally connected with wanting.

I wish

to emphasize that I am not offering an analysis of what is
sometimes meant by the phrase "necessary connection" but merely giving a name to one type of connection it is commonly
used to denote.

The notion of causal connection is not

much less obscure than that of necessary connection.

Indeed,

there are current analyses of both notions according to which
it would be incorrect to classify the former under the latter.

As obscure as the notion of causal connection is, how-

ever, it will suffice for the purpose of distinguishing the
sorts of necessary connection I intend to discuss below.
Now the causal interpretation of the necessary connection
held to obtain between pain and wanting has, I think, little
to recommend it.

First, the mechanistic model associated

1 Treatise, p. 439. By "good" and "evil," Hume tells
us immediately afterwards he means, respectively, the
sensations of pleasure and pain.
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with this interpretation does not seem to fit many ordinary
cases of avoiding what is painful or what gives some prospect of being painful.

Suppose I jump back suddenly upon

brushing against a hot stove.
made me jump.

Certainly it was the pain that

But need there have been a desire to jump

interposed between the pain and my jumping?

It would clearly

be unnatural to describe this case as one in which I felt a
searing pain, I wanted to jump backwards, and then I jumped.
Of course, this could have happened.

If someone were forc-

ing me against the stove so that I could not move away, then
it would be natural to describe me as wanting to move away.
But notice the difference between the two cases.

Again, if

I jump backwards at the leap and bark of the crocodile, I
need not have first wanted to jump, or even wanted to jump
in jumping, but simply jumped.

Secondly, even cases in

which there is room for the notion of wanting to avoid what
is painful or what gives the prospect of being painful are
not cases in which there is a causal connection between pain
and wanting.

Suppose I want to leave unopened the package

I receive because my friend has just warned me that it contains a bomb.

In this case, it is not the prospect of pain

which has made me want not to open the box but my friend's
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warning.

To maintain on the contrary that it is the pros-

pect of pain which has caused my wanting not to open the box
would be to confuse the cause of wanting with its object.
Wittgenstein's remark about fear in the following passage
applies mutatis mutandis to wanting:
We should distinguish between the object of fear and
the cause of fear. Thus a face which inspires fear
or delight (the object of fear or delight) , is not on
that account its cause, but--one might say--its
target.l
Thirdly, even cases in which what is painful or what gives
the prospect of being painful is the cause of my wanting to
avoid it are not cases in which there is a causal connection
between pain and wanting.

Consider again the case in which

someone is forcing me against a hot stove.

Suppose, further,

that he does not know that the stove is hot and asks me why
I want so much to move away from it.

I would not reply "Be-

cause of the searing pain in my back," but rather, "Because
the stove is hot."
ing objection:

One might be tempted to make the follow-

"But clearly it is not just because the stove

is hot that you want to move away from it.

The stove can be

hot even though you do not want to move away from it.

1 Phi·1osophical Investigations, sec. 4 76.

That
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part of your body touching the stove might be anaesthetized
so that you do not feel any pain."

Now the most this objec-

tion could show is not that the searing pain in my back is
the cause of my wanting to move away from the stove, but
that it is part of the cause of my wanting to move away from
the stove.

For it would be possible to reply:

"But clearly

it is not just because of the searing pain in my back that I
want to move away from the stove.

I can have a searing pain

in my back even though I do not want to move away from the
stove.

I might not be standing near the stove, or I might

not think I am standing near the stove but near the radiator,
or although I think I am standing near the stove I do not
think that the stove is hot but that the pain in my back is
due to the wrestling match I am engaged in, or • • • • "

But

to infer that A is the cause of B from the premises that C
is the cause of B and A is part of C is to commit a well-known
fallacy.

If the inference were valid, then one could cor-

rectly argue that since Antonius' eulogy of Caesar caused
much unrest among the multitude and the statement, "I come
to bury Caesar, not to praise him," was part of the eulogy,
this statement caused much unrest among the multitude.
do not think, however, that the objection succeeds in

I
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establishing even this much, viz. that the searing pain in
my back was part of the cause of my wanting to move away
from the stove.

For it suggests that when I gave the heat

of the stove as the cause of my wanting to move away from it,
I expected my auditor to go through some sort of process of
inference like the following:

"Since the stove is hot and

he is leaning against the stove, it follows that he has a
pain in his back.

Therefore, he wants to move away from the

stove, because part of the total situation in which he finds
himself is his having a pain in his back."

But, of course,

I do not expect him to go through any such process of inference.

I would have had third-degree burns by the time he

finished.

If I had truly expected this, I would have said

right out that I had a pain in my back without trying to test
his intelligence.

Further, if this case could be correctly

described as one in which such a process of inference occurred, the following conversation would have been reasonable:

"Yes, I know that the stove is hot and that you are

leaning against it,

But what has that got to do with your

wanting to move away from it?"

"What has that got to do with

it?--It follows that I am in pain, you clod!"
conversation would be ridiculous.

Such a

It would not be akin to a
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conversation like:

"Yes, I know that you have just looked

at the barometer and saw that it was falling.

But what has

that got to do with your wanting to take your UJrhrella?"
"A falling barometer means rain, you clod!"
tion at least makes sense.

This conversa-

The conversation about the stove

would be more akin to that special sort of nonsense which
Lewis Carroll immortalized in "The Mad Tea-Party."
The claim that there is a necessary connection between
pain and wanting seems to be false on the causal interpretation of necessary connection.

We shall have to search for a

different interpretation, then, if we are going to make out
this claim.

Although Aristotle, as we have seen, often

talks as though it is the causal interpretation he has in
mind when discussing the relation between pain and wanting,
it is possible to discern another interpretation in his writings which, I believe, brings his claim closer to the truth.
This second interpretation is suggested by the following
passage:
If any order of living things has the sensory, it must
also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus
of which desire, passion, and wish are the species; now
all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and
whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain
and therefore has pleasant and painfui objects present
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to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire,
for desire is just appetition of what is pleasant.l
It is clear, I think, that Aristotle is doing something else
in this passage than setting forth a causal mechanism.

If it

is not immediately clear, the context in which the passage
occurs leaves no doubt.

The problem to which Aristotle is

addressing himself is the definition of soul.

"It is evident

that the way to give the most ad.equate definition of soul,"
he says, "is to seek in the case of each of its forms for
the most appropriate definition."

2

one of the specific forms of soul.

The appetitive soul is
And while the appetitive

soul contains the attribute of sensation in its definition, 3
that attribute contains the appetitive soul in its own defini4
.
t ion.

Since pain is a species of sensation and desire an

essential attribute of the appetitive soul, therefore, it
would also follow that pain contains desire in its own definition.

This does not mean, of course, that pain must be de-

sired but that whatever has the capacity for pain must also
have the capacity for desire.
1

oe An. 414b 1-5.

2

This way of explaining the

oe An. 415a 12-13.

3 see De An. 414b 28-33.

4c£. Aristotle's discussion of essential attributes
which contain the subjects to which they belong in their
own definitions, Post. ~· 73a 34-b 1.
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connection between pain and wanting has also had its adherents throughout the history of philosophy.

One finds it

clearly expressed in the following passages of Descartes:
[The faculties of imagination and feeling] cannot be
[clearly and distinctly] conceived apart from me, that
is without an intelligent substance in which they reside, for • • • in their formal concept, some kind of
intellection is comprised, from which I infer that they
are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing.I
[A]ll these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are
in truth none other than certain confused modes of
thought which are produced by the union and apparent
intermingling of mind and body.2
Let us call the interpretation of "necessary connection" occurring in these passages from Aristotle and Descartes the "definitional interpretation."

To say that pain

is necessarily connected with wanting, on this interpretation, is to say that the concept of wanting is contained
in the definition of "pain."

Again, I wish it to be under-.

stood that I am not offering an analysis of what is sometimes meant by the phrase "necessary connection" but merely

1 Meditations, VI {HR, I, 190). Descartes classifies
pain as internal feelin'9=- Cf. Meditations, II and VI (HR,
I, 153 and 189).
2Meditations, VI {HR, I, 192). To say that xis a
mode of ~, as Descartes~ndicates in the first passage, is
to say that x cannot be clearly and distinctly conceived
apart from y~ although the converse does not hold. See
also Principles of Philosophy, I, 61 (HR, I, 244-45).
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. giving a name to one type of connection it is commonly used
to denote.

Like the notion of causal connection, the notion

of definition is not much less obscure than that of necessary connection.

And the notion of containment to which I

have just appealed goes no way, certainly, toward explicating that of definition.

Even so, at the intuitive level

there is a distinction between definitional connections and
causal connections, and this is all the present argument requires to mark off the two interpretations of "necessary connection. 111

I wish, however, further to refine the defini-

tional interpretation of "necessary connection" by marking
off two sub-classes--the analytic interpretation and what
I shall later call the "conceptual interpretation."

To say

that pain is necessarily connected with wanting, on the
analytic interpretation, is to say either that it cannot
rationally be conceived that there is some individual in or

1 rt is true that Aristotle accounts for the unity of
a definition in terms of a causal connection between its
elements. But this connection is not one of efficient
causality, as it would have to be to warrant assimilating
the interpretation of "necessary connection" based on the
mechanistic model to the definitional interpretation. The
genus of the definition, according to Aristotle, is the
material cause which is determined to the species by its
differentiae or, more properly, its last differentia, the
formal causes or cause of the definition. See Met. Bk vii,
ch. 12 and Bk. viii, ch. 6.
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anticipating pain who wants nothing, that is,
(A)

'~

( (~) ( (~ is in pain V

{3:Y)

{~wants~)))'

~

is anticipating pain)

:::i

cannot rationally be conceived

as expressing a true statement (expresses a false
statement in all possible worlds)

(expresses a self-

contradictory statement) 1
or that it cannot rationally be conceived that some individual with the capacity for pain lacks the capacity to
want, that is,
(B)

'

~

( (~)

(~

has the capacity for pain

:::i (3::l_ (x

has

~

'

& y is the capacity to want)))' cannot rationally
be conceived as expressing a true statement (expresses a false statement in all possible worlds)
expresses a self-contradictory statement).
Whether the analytic interpretation, as I have set forth,
adequately expresses the views of Aristotle and Descartes
in the passages just quoted is not clear.

I am inclined

to think that it is a correct expression, especially version
(B), of Descartes' views.

The case of Aristotle is much

1 These alternatives all stand in need of clarification,
and it is not obvious that once given they will be found to
be equivalent. Nevertheless, they will suffice to mark off
the two sub-classes of definitional connections I have in
mind.
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more difficult.

There is room for the development of his

remarks along the lines either of the analytic interpretation or the conceptual interpretation I discuss below.
The claim that there is a necessary connection between
pain and wanting is, I believe, more plausible on the analytic than on the causal interpretation.

Even so, I do not

think it can be upheld on either the (A) or (B) versions of
the analytic interpretation.

It succumbs in the end to

Hume's dictum that whatever can be conceived distinctly can
be conceived to exist separate from each other.
first version (A).

Consider

This version can be distinguished into

a stronger and weaker claim according as 'y''s range of application is or is not meant to be restricted to objects and
actions suitable (or, at least, thought suitable) to avoiding the particular pain

~

has.

Cases which fail to satisfy

the stronger claim can easily be imagined.

Some people pinch

themselves to find out whether they are dreaming.

In such

cases, although people anticipate pain, they do not want
to do anything to avoid it but on the contrary want to do
something to bring it on.

Again, masochism is a familiar

psychological aberration.

It is so common,. indeed, that

to call it an aberration seems no longer appropriate.
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In such cases, although people have pain, they do not want
to do anything to get rid of it but on the contrary want
to prolong it to the last delicious moment.

It might be

objected that the masochist could be correctly described as
wanting to avoid the pain of having no pain.
me to be nonsense.

This seems to

For it implies that if his desire is

not fulfilled, then it is fulfilled.

If he does not avoid

the pain of having no pain, then he has pain and, hence,
has avoided the pain of having no pain.
the weaker claim of version (A).

These cases satisfy

There are others, however,

which do not even satisfy this claim.

A person sometimes

has sympathetic pain when someone he loves is injured.

If

my young son has broken his leg, for example, I may feel
pain in my knee even though I have no injury there.

Now in

such cases the person cannot always be correctly said to want
to get rid of the pain.

In my example, my sympathetic pain

might have been occasioned by guilt feelings at having permitted my son to engage in the activity in which he broke
his leg and may help to assuage those feelings.

Nor can it

always be correctly said in such cases that what one wants
is to feel sympathy for the injured person.

Sometimes one

wants to feel sympathy for an injured person-- especially
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in cases where one thinks that one ought to feel sympathy
for him but cannot.

But normally one does not feel sympathy

because one wants to, nor is one's sympathetic feeling the
object of any want.

It might be objected that one who has

sympathetic pain must at least want to do whatever he can to
alleviate the pain of the injured person.

I think this is a

.

powerful objection vis-a-vis cases like that of my young

-----

son.

But this case can be slightly altered so as to reduce

the force of the objection.

Sympathetic pain is not always

occasioned by observing the sufferings of someone who is
loved.

It sometimes arises merely in the course of recount-

ing the details of these sufferings.

Suppose now that my

son had received mortal injuries and that I am recounting
the details of his sufferings after his death.

It certainly

could happen that I would have sympathetic pain, but I
would not want to do whatever I could to alleviate the pain
of my dead son.
viated it?

But wouldn't I want at least to have alle-

This cannot correctly be said.

As Aristotle

points out, although wishing may relate to things that
could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, wanting cannot, and what is past could in no way be brought
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about by one's own efforts. 1

But must not an individual

who has pain at least want something, no matter how farfetched the connection is between what he wants and the pain
he has?

I do not think that even this need be granted.

But,

first, notice how far the defender of the claim that there
is a necessary connection between pain and wanting has been
pushed.

He is no longer in the position of defending ver-

sion (A) of the analytic interpretation but version (B).
let us examine now version (B).

Cases which fail to satisfy

this version are also not very hard to find.
the case of a dog.

So

Consider first

A dog can be correctly said to be yelp-

ing with pain when he is being beaten.
be said to have the capacity to want?

But can he correctly
I believe so.

When

he is scratching violently round the edges and snuffling
along the bottom of a door beyond which there lies a piece
of meat, he can correctly be said to want the piece of meat.
Consider, however, a fly, an ant, or a bee.

Why do we think

a child cruel who tears the wings off a fly or impales it
on a pin to watch its futile struggles but are indifferent
when he tears the petals off a flower?

Is it not because

we think that he is . .taking delight in the suffering of his
1see Nie. Eth. Bk. ii, chs. 2 and 3 and Bk. vi, ch. 2.
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victim?

Suppose we learn afterwards that it is merely a

mechanical toy made to look very much like a fly. 1

It seems

clear that a fly can be correctly said to have the capacity
2
.
f or pain.

But now consider a fly buzzing around an uncover-

ed dish of honey.

We quite naturally say that the fly is

drawn or attracted to the honey, but would feel uncomfortable in saying that it wants the honey, unless we understood
this as a metaphorical way of saying just that it is drawn
or attracted to the honey. 3

Contrast this case with that

of the dog which is scratching violently around the edges
and snuffling along the bottom of the door.

To say that he

is drawn or attracted to the meat seems to be only a metaphorical way of saying that he wants it.

It makes sense

to speak of wanting something only where it also makes sense
to distinguish wanting it from merely being drawn or attracted to it, which does not imply, of course, that someone
1we do not normally chastise a child who breaks the
arms off his toy soldiers. In fact, we expect it.
2Notice how we hasten to assure each other that the
shrill sound we hear when boiling a live lobster is just
the air escaping from beneath its shell.
3consider: A man can be drawn or attracted to someone
with whom he does not want to have anything to do. But can
a fly be drawn or attracted to something it does not want?
Is this merely because a fly always wants what it is drawn
or attracted to? Oh, happy creature!

78

cannot want what he is drawn or attracted to.

But in the

case of a fly such a distinction makes no sense.

It makes

no sense in the sense that there are no criteria whose satisfaction would establish that a fly is drawn or attracted to
what he does not want.

But then a fly cannot be correctly

said to have the capacity to want, although it can be correctly said to have a capacity for pain.
Do these difficulties with the causal and analytic
interpretations show that Aristotle and Descartes were wrong
to claim a necessary connection between pain and wanting?
I think that most of us feel there is something right in what
they were saying.

I would like now to try to disclose the

source of our refusal to reject their claim even when faced
with such obvious counterexamples to its two most natural
interpretations.

The concept of pain is such that we would

not have that concept unless we also had the concept of wanting.

I am guided here by Wittgenstein's remarks:
• • • if things were quite different from what they
actually are--if there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, or joy; if rule became
exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency--this would make our
normal language-games lose their point • • • • What we
have to mention in order to explain the significance,
I mean the importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are
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hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality. 1
One fact of nature, which is clearly of the kind Wittgenstein
had in mind, is that most human beings who have pain generally want to get rid of it and that most human beings who
anticipate pain generally want to avoid it.

Wanting to get

rid of pain and wanting to avoid it are characteristic experiences of pain which partly explain our having the concept of pain.

This fact, of course, does not fully explain

our having the concept of pain.

A more complete explana-

tion would have to mention such facts which show that it is
natural for most human beings generally to react to the painbehavior of other human beings by pitying and treating the
part that hurts, facts to which Wittgenstein calls attention
when he remarks:
Imagine not merely the words 'I am in pain' but also
the answer 'It's not so bad' replaced by instinctive
noises and gestures.2
If it were not natural for most human beings generally to
react this way, if, for example, our natural attitude toward
someone exhibiting pain-behavior were the same as our

1QE_. cit., sec. 142 and note.
2 rbid., sec. 310. Cf. also ibid., pp.· 179-80 and
Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1967) ,. secs. 540-41 and 545.
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attitude toward a machine one of whose parts had just
c

broken off, there would be no point to our language-game
with the word "pain."

But this fact and the language-game

which it partly explains do not rule out the possibility
that some human beings generally do not pity or try to comfort and heal other human beings who exhibit pain-behavior
or even that most human beings sometimes do not react this
way.

Similarly, that it is natural for most human beings

generally to want to get rid of and avoid pain and the language-game which this fact partly explains do not rule out
the possibility that some human beings generally do not
want to get rid of or avoid pain or that most human beings
sometimes do not want to get rid of or avoid pain or even
that some individuals 1 which have the capacity for pain and
which are in pain lack the capacity to want anything at all.

1 The application of the concept of pain to flies, ants,
and bees is based on resemblances between their behavior
and the behavior of human beings in similar circumstances.
Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks 11 • • • only of a living human
being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being
can one say: it has sensations • • • " (Philosophical
Investigations, sec. 281). "Look at a stone and imagine
it having sensations .·--one says to oneself: How could one
so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?
One might as well ascribe it to a number!--And now look at a
wriggling fly and at once these difficultie~ vanish and pain
seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything
was, so to speak, too smooth for it" (ibid., sec. 284).
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But if this were not a fact of nature, then, again, there
would be no point to our language-game with the word "pain."
I shall call this interpretation of the necessary connection
claimed to hold between pain and wanting the "conceptual
interpretation."
I wish to make it clear, if it is not already clear,
that the foregoing is not an argument.

It is an attempt to

explain the source of our refusal to reject the claim that
there is a necessary connection between pain and wanting
even when faced with obvious counterexamples to two of its
most natural interpretations and to propose a third interpretation of this claim which avoids these counterexamples.
Now, it may be objected that the explanation given is really
no explanation at all, since it presupposes a distinction
between what is essential to a language-game and what is
not, and this distinction is just what needs to be explained.
The necessary connection between pain and wanting, on the
present view, is to be explained in terms of the role wanting plays in the language-game of pain.
that this role is an essential one?

But how do we know

Wittgenstein puts the

objection as follows:
But how can I decide what is an essential, and what
an inessential, accidental, feature of the notation?
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Is there some reality lying behind the notation,
which shapes its grarnmar?l
Wittgenstein makes no explicit reply to this objection,
but it is clear from many of the things that he says 2 what
his reply would be.

It is one that I accept.

To decide

what is an essential, and what an inessential, accidental,
feature of a language-game, describe the language-game.

As-

semble cases which throw light on the importance of a given
feature to the language-game in question.

In particular,

to decide whether wanting plays an essential or inessential
role in the language-game of pain, describe the languagegame of pain.

In Chapter II, I assembled cases which, I

believe, show the importance of wanting to the languagegame of pain.

Declining an invitation, making an appointment

to see the dentist, hiring someone to do the heavy work
involved in running one's business, a person's selling his
business and marrying someone who he knows can be depended
on to take care of him all constitute behavior expressive
of both wanting and pain.

But, clearly, it does not follow

1 Philosophical Investigations, sec. 562.
2 see ibid., especially secs. 89-133.
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from the fact that such behavior is expressive of both wanting and pain that wanting is an essential feature of the language-game with the word "pain."

Such behavior is expres-

sive of many other things besides, some of which it would
be most implausible to claim were essential to the languagegame.

Even granting that such cases exist and are indeed

common, can there not be disagreement in their interpretation?

And, further, cannot other cases be cited of behavior

expressive of pain but not of wanting?

Of course.

That

there is disagreement regarding what is essential to a
language-game, however, only shows that further description,
the assembling of additional cases, is required.
should it be thought that there must

~

But why

be agreement in

the interpretation of cases, that there must
ment as to what is essential and what is not?

~be

agree-

If there can-

not be a private language, if language is essentially interpersonal, as Wittgenstein claims and tries to show, then
there must be such agreement.
If language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also
(queer as this may sound) in judgments.!

1 Ibid., sec. 242.
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This is because "the speaking of language is part of an
activity, or of a form of life. 111

Agreement in judgments

"is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 112

I

accept this view.
Now the concept of a brain process is not tied up with
the concept of wanting in the same way that the concept of
pain is.

It is not essential to the language-game in which
'

the word "brain process" has its original home that human
beings want to put an end to or avoid the occurrence of certain kinds of brain processes or even that human beings
want anything at all.

The concept of a brain process in

fact belongs to an entirely different region of language
than does the concept of wanting--to the order, one might
say, of causes rather than to the order of reasons.

One

of the virtues of the conceptual interpretation of the necessary connection claimed to hold between pain and wanting is
that it focuses'attention on just this point.

What makes

it easy to confuse the two orders of explanation, I believe,
is, first, the fact that they are both orders of explanation and, second, the failure carefully to distinguish

~., sec. 23.

1

2

Ibid,, sec. 241.
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between the quite different notions of explaining why an
event occurred and substantiating its occurrence, that is,
describing evidence on the basis of which it would be rational to assert that the event did occur.

That the word

"explanation" is used in both orders does not bring them
any closer together than does the fact that the word "prediction" is also used in both orders.

Compare in this regard

Wittgenstein's remark:
Examine these two language-games:
(a) Someone gives someone else the order to make
particular movements with his arm, or to assume particular bodily positions (gymnastics instructor and pupil).
And here is a variation of this language-game: the
pupil gives himself orders and then carries them out.
(b) Someone observes certain regular processes-for example, the reactions of different metals to acids-and thereupon makes predictions about the reactions that
will occur in certain particular cases.
There is an evident kinship between these two language-games, and also a fundamental difference. In
both one might call the spoken words 'predictions.'
But compare the training which leads to the first technique with the training for the second one.l
And although the occurrence of a certain kind of brain process could become evidence for the occurrence of a certain
kind of wanting (on the ground of observed correlations
between the occurrence of brain processes of that kind and
behavioral criteria for the occurrence of wantings of that

1 rbid_. , sec. 630.
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kind) , statements describing the occurrence of the former
could not, together with general laws, explain why a wanting of any kind occurred.

The reason one might be tempted

to believe that they can, even apart from the failure to
distinguish explanation from substantiation, is that statements describing the occurrence of a certain kind of brain
process could, together with general laws, explain the occurrence of events which count as evidence for the occurrence of a certain kind of wanting.

Thus, such statements

could explain the occurrence of other kinds of brain processes correlated with behavioral criteria for the occurrence
of that kind of wanting or even explain the occurrence of
the bodily movements which such behavioral criteria involve.
There are many features of the concept of wanting in
virtue of which it falls outside the order of explanation
to which the concept of a brain process belongs.

In the

passage just quoted, Wittgenstein asks us to compare the
11

training 11 which leads to the employment of a concept in

the order of causes with the training which leads to the
employment of a concept in the order of reasons.

It is

easy to see that the training which leads to the employment
of the concept of wanting is very different from the training
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which leads to the employment of the concept of a brain process.

Again, in the passage immediately succeeding this one,

Wittgenstein contrasts the "antecedents" of--that is, the
"thoughts, actions and so on" which lead up to--propositions
employing concepts such as that of wanting with the antecedents of propositions employing concepts such as that of a
brain process.

And in earlier passages, he speaks of the

"surroundings" essential to the'employment of a concept. 1
It is easy to see that the surroundings essential to the
employment of the concept of wanting are very different
from those essential to the employment of the concept of a
brain process.

The concept of wanting requires institu-

tions, customs, practices.

Thus, a person cannot want to be

king or want a lot of money unless there exist governmental
institutions or financial institutions.

But such institu-

tions are not required for the employment of the concept
of a brain process.

A further feature of the concept of

wanting, which Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss
but which has lately received considerable attention, is that
a particular occurrence of wanting can be identified only by

1see ibid., secs. 583-84.
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reference to an object in an intentional description, that
is to say, in that description of the object wanted under
which it is wanted by the individual in question.

Not every

true description of an object is one under which an individual wants it; only under certain of its descriptions will it
be wanted.

This feature is also one in virtue of which the

concept of wanting falls outside the order of explanation to
which the concept of a brain process belongs.

Only events

which do not essentially fall under an intentional description or whose identification does not essentially involve
reference to an object in an intentional description are
appropriate explananda for this order of explanation.
The concept of pain does not entirely fall outside the
order of explanation to which the concept of a brain process belongs.

It, as it were, straddles both the order of

causes and the order of reasons.

While it is possible to

explain the occurrence of a pain by reference to the occurrence of a certain kind of brain process, it is also possible to explain the occurrence of a certain kind of wanting
by reference to the occurrence of a pain.

That the concept

of pain has also a role to play in the orde:ir of explanation
to which the concept of wanting belong-s is a consequence of

.·;\
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the conceptual interpretation of the necessary connection
claimed to hold between pain and wanting.

Indeed it is

only on the conceptual interpretation, I believe, that this
fact about pain becomes fully intelligible.

The middle posi-

tion of pain with respect to the two orders of explanation
seems to have been recognized by Descartes, for he makes
pain as well as all the other sensations "certain confused
'
modes of thought which are produced
by the union and apparent

intermingling of mind and body. 111

Now it may be said that

if it is possible to explain the occurrence of a pain by
reference to the occurrence of a certain kind of brain process and possible to explain the occurrence of a certain kind
of wanting by reference to the occurrence of a pain, then it
should be possible to explain the occurrence of a certain
kind of wanting by reference to the occurrence of a pain.
And this would mean that the concept of wanting does not
after all fall outside the order of explanation to which the
concept of a brain process belongs.

But this objection

assumes that explanation must he transitive, and such is

1Meditations, VI (HR, I, 192). Descartes classifies
desire as an "action ofthe soul" and says that all our desires "proceed directly from our soul, and appear to depend
on it alone" (The Passions of the Soul, I, 17 (HR, I, 340)).
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clearly not the case.

It is easy to think of cases which

show that explanation is not transitive.

Thus, for example,

"A killed B's father" could be an explanation of why B
killed A but not why C (who is A's son) then killed B.
The view that pain is necessarily connected with wanting
is on the conceptual interpretation of this necessary connection unaffected by obvious counterexamples to two of its most
natural interpretations.

This view, I have shown, was held

both by Aristotle and Descartes and is in agreement, I believe, with the sorts of things we would be naturally inclined to say about the connection between pain and wanting.
But a consequence of the conceptual interpretation is that
the concept of wanting falls outside the order of explanation
to which the concept of a brain process belongs and that the
concept of pain has a role to play in the order of explanation to which the concept of wanting belongs.

These consid-

erations cast serious doubt, I believe, on the claim that it
would be reasonable in the light of future scientific advances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensationstatemen ts in our lives could be taken over by neurophysiological statements.

We are not yet in a position

fully to
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assess this claim, however.

For a natural reply to this line

of argument would be to grant that the concept of wanting
falls outside the order of explanation to which the concept
of a brain process belongs but then to go on to claim that
future scientific advances could make it reasonable to redescribe the relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate
the concept of wanting in favor of a concept which does not
fall outside the order of explanation-to which the concept
of a brain process belongs--in
concept of

favo~

say, of a complex

bodily-movements-~-brain-processes.

I do not

think, however, that this second claim is anymore plausible
than the first, and for precisely analogous reasons.

For

intending is necessarily connected with wanting in the same
sense of "necessary connection" in which pain is necessarily
connected with wanting.

This should not be surprising, since,

as P. F. Strawson observes, the concepts which clearly imply
intention "are inextricably bound up with," "interwoven
with" the other concepts which imply the possession of
consciousness on the part of that to which they are applied.
"The topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected
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I believe it is this notion of the unity of

mind which also lies behind the following passage from
Aristotle:
• • • particulars subsumed under [living beings] constitute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g • • • • the sensory
power the nutritive • • • • [C]ertain living beings--a
small minority--possess calculation and thought, for
(among mortal beings) those which possess calculation
have all the other powers above mentioned [viz. the
nutritive, appetitive, sensory, and locomotive powers]. 2
Now if intending is necessarily connected with wanting according to the conceptual interpretation, the elimination
of the concept of wanting will involve also the elimination
of the concept of intending.

But the existence of this lat-

ter concept is surely essential to the existence of the concept of a person.

To use the terminology of Descartes to ex-

press a view with which, perhaps, he might have disagreed:
Intending is the essential attribute of persons. 3

If the

elimination of the concept of a person were a consequence
of the elimination of the concept of wanting, we would be
entitled, I think, to conclude that future scientific
1 Individuals (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
1963), p. 109.
2 De An. 414b 29-415a 10. Aristotle held that the power
to feeY-pain is necessarily connected with,if not included
under, the sensory power. See De An. 413b 22-23.
3 I do not in fact think that Descartes would have disagreed with this view. I rely here on Jaako Hintikka's
profound interpretation of Descartes' cogi·to argument in his
article "Cogito; Erao Sum: Inference or Performance?,"
Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, Jan. 1962, pp. 3-32.
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advances could not make it reasonable to redescribe the
relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate the concept of wanting in favor of a concept which does not fall
outside the order of explanation to which the concept of a
brain process belongs. 1

That intending is necessarily con-

nected with wanting is a view which, as the last passage
quoted indicates, Aristotle held and is in agreement, I believe, with the sorts of things we would be naturally inclined to say about the connection between them.

Just as

in the case of pain and wanting, however, there are obvious
counterexamples to two of the most natural interpretations
of this necessary connection.

Such counterexamples are

otiose vis-a-vis the conceptual interpretation of this necessary connection.

In what follows I offer arguments in sup-

port of these claims.

My arguments will be briefer than

the ones offered in support of the parallel claims regarding
pain and wanting, since the arguments for both sets of claims
are precisely analogous.
In the case of intending and wanting, as with pain and

1 The concept of a person, I hold, is an essential
feature of our conceptual scheme. The possibility of
eliminating this concept is enc which I consider later on
in this chapter.
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wanting, Aristotle wavers between a causal and a definitional interpretation of "necessary connection."

The clear-

est statements of these interpretations occur respectively
in the following two passages:
The origin of action--its efficient, not its final
cause--is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end.l
The object of choice being one of the things in our
own power which is desired after deliberation, choice
will be deliberate desire of things in our own power;
for when we have decided as a result of deliberation,
we desire in accordance with our deliberation,2
These two passages together provide an account of how someone comes to perform an action.

To put is schematically, A

wants something X, deliberates on the means of obtaining X,
decides on Y, and then rationally wants (chooses, intends)
to do Y, which results--if nothing external prevents it-in his doing Y.

On this account, wanting is both causally

and definitionally connected with intending.

A's wanting

X is a causally necessary condition (in the sense of efficient causality) of his intending to do something Y which
he regards as a means of obtaining X, and A's intending to

1Nic. Eth. 1139a 31-32. Aristotle uses the concept of
"choicen-where we would use that of "intent.ion."
2N.J.C. Eth. 1113a 10-12.
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do Y just consists in his rationally wanting to do Y.

The

objections raised earlier to the view that there is a necessary connection between pain and wanting, where "necessary
connection" is interpreted either causally or definitionally
(in the analytic sense}, have their counterparts here.
First, the mechanism Aristotle sets up between A's wanting
something X and A's doing Y with the intention of obtaining
X does not seem to fit many ordinary cases of acting with
intention.

Suppose that while in the supermarket I pass

the dairy counter and, suddenly remembering that I am out of
eggs, reach out, take the top carton off the third stack of
cartons, and put it in my shopping-cart.

Now it is certain-

ly true that I wanted eggs and performed this particular
action with the intention of obtaining them.

But I did not

deliberate on the various possible ways of obtaining them,
decide on reaching out, taking the top carton off the third
stack of cartons, and putting it in my shopping-cart, and
then intend to do just that, whereupon I did it.

In this

case, although the intermediate steps seem to be lacking,
wanting and acting with intention are both present.

It

might be said, therefore, that the case does not provide a
counterexample to the view that wanting is a causally
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necessary condition of intending.

Now there are some cases

in which it is plausible to claim that wanting is a cause of
intentional action.

Suppose someone were to ask me why I am

going to the supermarket, and I answer that I am out of eggs.
It could be argued that I am giving a causal explanation of
my action in terms of my wants.

If I do not want any eggs,

the fact that I am out of them will not explain why I am going to the supermarket.

But whatever analysis of causation

one accepts, a causal explanation must at least make what
is explained more intelligible than it was before.

This

condition, however, would not be satisfied by a putative
causal explanation in terms of my wants of the action in my
original case.

If someone were to ask me why I took the top

carton of eggs off the third stack of cartons and put it in
my shopping-cart, the answer "I wanted some eggs" would not
make my action any more intelligible than it was before.
Wanting-statements can serve as causal explanations only in
certain circumstances.
Secondly, cases can easily be found or invented which
fail to satisfy the formla "A's intending to do Y just
consists in his rationally wanting to do Y..

Interestingly,

there arc hints of such cases in the very same discussion
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in which Aristotle presents his definition of "choice."
Consider the following remarks:
[M]en make themselves responsible for being • • • selfindulgent • • • by spending their time in drinking
bouts and the like: for it is activities exercised on
particular objects that make the corresponding character • • • • [I]t is irrational to suppose that a man
who acts • • • self-indulgently [does not wish] to be
self-indulgent. • • • [T] o the self-indulgent man, it
was open at the beginning not to become [a man] of this
kind, and so [he is] self-indulgent voluntarily • • • • 1
These remarks suggest the following counterexample to the
above formula.

A intends to stay away from Jimmy's tonight

even though he does not want to stay away, because he knows
that unless he can bring himself to stop now he will end up
like his father.

Now if A does not want to stay away, then

a fortiori he does not rationally want to stay away.

So A

intends to do something he does not rationally want to do.
It might be replied that wants run counter to one another,
as is well known, so that it is possible to describe this
case as one in which A both wants and does not want to stay
away.

The issue, however, is not whether it is possible

to describe this case in such a way but whether it is possible to describe it as one in which A has no desire whatever
to stay away.

To argue that although A does not want to

1 Nic. Eth. 1114a 5-21.
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stay away,

A·~

·rationally want to stay away because clear-

ly A wants a temperate character and A regards staying away
a necessary means of obtaining one would be futile.

For

by parity of reasoning one could argue that A must rationally
want not to stay away because

~

wants to get drunk and re-

gards not staying away a means of obtaining this condition.
So that A rationally wants both to stay away and not to stay
away.

And since rationally wanting something

~'

according

to the formula, is intending to do X, it would follow that
A intends both to stay away and not to stay away, which is
absurd.

Now this case would satisfy a weaker version of the

formula which, nevertheless, still implied an analytic connection between intending and wanting:

If A intends to do

something X, then either A must want to do X or else A must
want Y and regard X as a means of obtaining

!·

The case

just presented does satisfy the second disjunct of the
apodosis.

There are cases which can be constructed, however,

which fail to satisfy even this version.

For persons can--

and, indeed, often do--intend to do things which they do
not regard as a means of obtaining what they want but as a
means of obtaining what someone else wants.

It might be

replied that such cases are ones in which the persons do
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want something after all which what they intend to do will
be a means of obtaining, namely, they want that the other
person's wants be satisfied.
ways true.

But this is certainly not al-

I may intend to do something I do not want to do

for someone whom I hate--someone whose wants I do not want
to be satisfied.

I intend to do it out of fear.

But then

do I not intend to do it because I want, at least, to preserve myself?

Not necessarily.

The person whom I fear may

have died long ago, as I am well aware, but his influence on
me while living might have been such that I cannot now bring
myself to act contrary to what I think he would have wanted.
But must I not at least want something?

This brings us to

the weakest version of the claim that there is a necessary
connection between intending and wanting, on the analytic
interpretation of "necessary condition":

If A is able to

act with intention, then A must have the capacity to want.
The status of this claim is a profoundly difficult issue.
It cannot be decided by bringing forward cases but turns
on the question of whether the concept of a necessarily
perfect being--hence, one that necessarily wants nothing-which nevertheless acts freely is internally consistent.
The intelligibility of such a concept is not obvious, but
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neither is its unintelligibility obvious.
I do not think, however, that the issue of whether intending is necessarily connected with wanting is as profoundly difficult as this one nor that it must wait for its
solution upon the solution of the latter.

If the necessary

connection claimed to hold between intending and wanting is
given a conceptual interpretation, then, I think, the issue
can be resolved in favor of the claim.

The concept of in-

tending is such that we would not have that concept unless
we also had the concept of wanting.

That most human beings

. generally want to do what they intend to do and that most
human beings generally want to perform the intentional actions they in fact perform are both contingent facts.

But

unless there were such general facts we would have no use
for the concept of intending.
in our lives.

It would have no role to play

If we were to come upon a tribe of super-

ascetics who were in all other respects like human beings
except that they never wanted to do what they in fact did,
what right would we have to say that they had any wants at
all?

The distinction between wanting and wishing would seem

to lose its purpose in such circumstances, and so we would
probably hesitate to use the concept of wanting.

But then
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would we still be willing to use the concept of intending?
The phenomena, as Wittgenstein remarks in another connec.

tion,

1

.

.

would gravitate towards another paradigm.

Paradoxi-

cally, we would probably come to view the actions of these
super-ascetics in the way we view the movements of leaves
blown about by the wind.

I am not saying that the concept

of a super-ascetic is unintelligible.

Once we have the

concept of intending we can extend it to individuals who
never want to do what they do and thus also come to have the
concept of a super-ascetic.

We may even be able to extend

it to a being which has no wants whatever.

But a necessary

condition of doing this is that it have some role to play in
our lives, and it would have no role to play unless most of
us generally wanted to do the things we did.
We are now in a better position to assess the claim
that it would be reasonable in the l:ight of future scientific
advances of the appropriate sort to revise our conceptual
scheme in such a way that the role played by sensationstatements in our lives could be taken over by neurophysiological statements.

Earlier

I

argued that the most satis-

factory account of the connection between pain and wanting

,

...Op. cit., sec. 385.
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can be given on what I have called the "conceptual interpretation."

A consequence of the conceptual interpretation,

however,·· is that while sensation-statements do in fact explain the occurrence of certain kinds of wanting, neuro1

physiological statements could not explain why a wanting of
any kind occurred.

To avoid the conclusion that sensation-

statements play an important role in our lives which could not
be taken over by neurophysiological statements, it seemed
possible to argue that future scientific advances could make
it reasonable to redescribe the relevant phenomena in such a
way as to eliminate the concept of wanting in favor of a concept of a type of event whose occurrences could be explained
by neurophysiological statements.

The conceptual interpreta-

tion, however, also provides the most satisfactory account
of the connection between intending and wanting, and a consequence of this interpretation is that the elimination of the
concept of wanting would involve the elimination of the concept of intending.

And since intending is, if not the, at

least an essential feature of the concept of a person,
the elimination of the concept of the former would result
in the elimination of the latter.

In view of this result,

I think that we would be justified in rejecting the claim
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that it would be reasonable to revise our conceptual scheme
in the way suggested.

I do not propose to argue here that

intending is an essential feature of the concept of a person, although I believe that compelling arguments can be given.

What would have to be shown is that in the same way in

which the concepts of pain, wanting, and intending are connected the concept of intending is connected with the vast
majority of concepts of the states of consciousness which
would be regarded--if not severally, then at least some
group or another of them--as essential features of the concept of a person.

Such arguments would be lengthy but would

not involve anything essentially different from the arguments
I have presented in my discussion of pain, wanting, and intending.

Should it be thought possible to analyze the con-

cept of a person into purely "theoretical" concepts, my reply is that mental concepts do not fall into two mutually
exclusive classes called "theoretical" and "practical."
This is a fact which has often been pointed out.

Wittgen-

stein 1 s notions of a "language-game" and "form of life" are
both expressions of and meant to give expression to this
fact.

And the centrality of the concept of .intention among

mental concepts applicable to persons has received recognition
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in a growing literature already too extensive to cite.
I want to consider one final suggestion for avoiding
the conclusion that sensation-statements play an important
role in our lives which could not be taken over by neurophysiological statements.

It may be suggested that future scien-

tific advances could make it reasonable to redescribe the
relevant phenomena in such a way as to eliminate the concept
of a person with its essential feature of intention in favor
of a concept of a type of entity lacking features not amenable to neurophysiological explanation.

I think, however, that

an argument can be constructed on the basis of the centrality
of the concept of intention among concepts applicable to persons which shows that this suggestion is logically absurd. 1
First, describing (and hence redescribing) , whether "public"
or "private," is an intentional act.

Generally, all of think-

ing except the mere entertaining of a proposition and the
free constructions of the imagination in reverie and dreaming (I rule out the thinking of an intuitive understanding
such as God is often said to have) involves judging, and

1

I am indebted to Norman Malcolm's article, "The Conceivability of Mechanism" (Philosophical ·Review, LXXVII
(1968), 45-72, especially pp. 67-71) for the idea of such
an argument.
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this in turn, since judging is either affirming or denying,
is an intentional act.

If the concept of intention did not

exist, accordingly, no marks or sounds would count as "descriptions."

Second, having rational grounds for saying or

doing anything implies that the saying or doing is intentional.

Without the concept of intention, accordingly, nothing

would count as "rational grounds" for anything.

The logical

absurdity of the suggestion under discussion, then, is that
the elimination of the concept of a person with its essential feature of intention is inconsistent with, first, the
existence of redescriptions in virtue of which it has been
eliminated and, second, the existence of scientific advances
which make reasonable such redescriptions.

CHAPTER IV
INCORRIGIBILITY AND MIND-BODY IDENTITY
In the controversy between partisans of the Mind-Body
Identity Theory and their opponents, logical similarities
and differences be.tween explanation-types have received little attention.

My discussion so far has focused on logical

differences between sensation-explanation and physiological
explanation which must be taken account of in deciding this
controversy.

I want to consider now an issue which has re-

ceived considerable attention of late, the so-called issue
of "incorrigibility."

Opponents of the Mind-Body Identity

Theory claim that incorrigibility (in the sense defined below) is an important feature of sensation-statements which
could not be a feature of physiological statements.

Identity

Theorists have replied either by challenging the significance
of incorrigibility in the sense in which it cannot be a
feature of physiological statements or by trying to show
that it would be reasonable in the light of future
ic advances to eliminate in principle this feature.

scientif~

I

do

not propose in this chapter to take up the question of
whether the incorrigibility of sensation-statements can be
eliminated.

This question will occupy the whole of Chapter
106
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V.

What I will try to show there is that the same logical

differences between explanation-types which make doubtful
the possibility of eliminating sensation-statements also
make doubtful the possibility of eliminating incorrigibility
as a feature of these statements.

The discussion of the pres-

ent chapter will focus on the significance of incorrigibility
for the Mind-Body Identity Theory.
The issue of incorrigibility has recently focused on
attempts to distinguish various possible senses in which
persons might be said to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-a-vis their own current mental states. 1
The senses which are of most concern to the present discussion have been conveniently summarized by Norman Malcolm
in a recent essay.
I think the facts that give rise to the illusion of
privacy would be the following:
(a) you can be in
doubt as to whether I am in pain, but I cannot; · (b)
you can find out whether I am in pain, but I cannot;
and (c) you can be mistaken as to whether I am in
pain,-but I cannot.2

1 The most notable of such attempts are William Alston's
"Varieties of Privileged Access," American Philosophical
Quarterl:t, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 223-241, and A. J. Ayer's
"Privacy," in his The Concept of ~ Person and Other Essays
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963).
211 The Privacy of Experience," in A. Stroll, ed., Epistemolo_g~, r;re~ ~~~?ays in the Theory of Knowledge (New York:
Harper & Row, 1967), p. 146.
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I shall hereafter refer to the conjunction of propositions
which results from generalizing these three claims to cover
all phenomenal states (as opposed to dispositional states,
such as beliefs, desires, and attitudes) as the "thesis of
incorrigibility."

Descartes was the first philosopher, I

believe, to have realized the metaphysical significance of
the thesis of incorrigibility.

He saw it as providing the

criterion by which to distinguish mind from matter. 1

With

the steadily increasing sophistication of materialist theories of the mind since Descartes, there has been a corresponding increase in the sophistication of the metaphysical employment of this thesis.

The thesis of incorrigibility has been

strengthened and refined in various ways until it has <leveloped into a powerful objection to such theories.

Among the

most vigorous recent proponents of this thesis is Wittgenstein and many of the philosophers who claim to have been
influenced by him.

All three components of the thesis are

expressed in the following well-known passages from the

1 oescartes held that persons are in a specially favorable epistemic position in the three senses stated above
even vis-a-vis their own dispositional stat~s (see Meditations-;--YI-and III (HR, I, 153 and 157)). Most philosophers
today would not accept this view without considerable qualification.
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Philosophical Investigations:
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations
only from my behavior,--for I cannot be said to learn
of them. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense
to say about other people that they doubt whether I am
in pain; but not to say it about myself.I
My temptation to say that one might take a sensation
for something other than what it is arises from this:
if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game
with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion
of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility
of error also exists.2
G. E. M. Anscombe in Intention claims that pain belongs to a
class of things about which a person has the right to speak
without observation, which is not to say that they are
known without observation.

It makes no sense to speak here

of knowledge at all, she holds, since there is no possibility
of being wrong. 3

John Cook, in an important article on the

"private language argument," argues that it makes sense to
speak of a person's finding out that he is in pain only if
it makes sense to speak of a person as not being "in as
good a position as one could want" for correctly answering
a certain question or making a certain statement about his

1 Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York:
sec. 246.
2 Ibid., sec. 288.

221-22~

3 {rthaca:

Macmillan, 1953},

See also secs. 289, 408, and pp.

Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 13~14.
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pain, and that this last does not make sense. 1

Again, he

suggests that "where [someone] thinks we can (or do) doubt
or make mistakes about our sensations, he has merely oddly
described something else. 112

Two components of the thesis

of incorrigibility are expressed in the following passage
from Sydney Shoemaker's book, Self-Knowledge and SelfIdentity:
[First-person present-tense phenomenal statements] are
incorrigible in the sense that if a person sincerely
asserts such a statement it does not make sense to suppose, and nothing could be accepted as showing, that he
is mistaken, i.e., that what he says is false • • • •
[I]t is characteristic of [first-person present-tense
phenomenal statements] that being entitled to assert
such a statement does not consist in having established
that the statement is true, i.e., in having good evidence that it is true or having observed that it is
true, but consists simply in the statement's being
true. 3
And Shoemaker makes it clear that he thinks the third component to follow from the conjunction of these two.

It

is because this conjunction is true that "the sentence 'I
seem to be in pain' is, if not senseless, without a role

111 wittgenstein on Privacy," Philosophical Review,

vol. 74 (1965), pp. 285-86.
2 rbid., p. 288.
3 crthaca:

Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 216.
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to play in our language. 111

Finally, Robert Coburn, in the

course of defending Strawson's claim that it is essential to
the character of phenomenal predicates

11

that they are both

self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation
of the behavior of the subject of them, and other-ascribable
on the basis of behavior criteria, 112 details a number of "absurdities 11 which he claims to follow from denying any one of
the three components. 3
The metaphysical employment of the thesis of incorrigibility (METI) has naturally been subjected to heavy criticism
by philosophers interested in defending one form or another
of materialism.

It has also been criticized by philosophers

who have no special interest in defending materialism but who
are merely dissatisfied with the arguments offered in its
favor.

On canvassing the recent literature, I think it is

possible to discern six general lines of reply which this
criticism has taken.

These may conveniently be set out as

1 rbid., p. 226, n.
2rndividuals (New York:

Doubleday, 1963), pp. 104-105.

311 Persons and Psychological Concepts, 11 American Philo-

sophical Quarterly, vol. 4 (1967), pp. 214-20.
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follows:
(R1 )

Incorrigibility is not a feature of our phenomenal concepts.

(R2 )

Although incorrigibility is a feature of our
phenomenal concepts, the empirical facts could
have been such that our phenomenal concepts lacked this feature.

(R )
3

Although incorrigibility is a feature of our
phenomenal concepts, the empirical facts could
have been such that we lacked concepts with this
feature.

(R 4 )

Although incorrigibility is a feature of phenomenal
concepts, it does not follow that sincere firstperson present-tense reports of phenomenal states
cannot justifiably be over-ridden.

(R5 )

Although incorrigibility is a feature of our
phenomenal concepts, additions to our stock of
empirical knowledge together with advances in
technology could lead to the elimination of this
feature from our phenomenal concepts.

(R 6 )

Although incorrigibility is a

fea~ure

of our

phenomenal concepts, additions to our stock of
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empirical knowledge together with advances in
technology could lead to the elimination of concepts with this feature.
The strategy behind (R1 )-(R6 ) is to show not that the thesis
of incorrigibility is false but that the only sense in which
it may be true is one that is not damaging to any materialist
theory of the mind.

The force of (R1 ) is that the thesis

of incorrigibility is plausible only as an empirical thesis
and so cannot be used to show that there is some reason in
logic preventing the reduction of phenomenal concepts to
neurophysiological concepts.

The force of (R2 )-(R6 ) is that

although it is not an empirical thesis, it does nothing to
show that persons are in a specially favorable epistemic
position vis-a-vis their own current phenomenal states,
since some or all of its components are either bare tautologies or true in virtue of linguistic conventions modifiable
in the light of future empirical inquiry.
Common to (R5 ) and (R6 ) are the claims (1) that incorrigibility is a feature of our phenomenal concepts and (2) that
additions to our stock of empirical knowledge together with
advances in technology could lead to the elimination in
principle of this feature.

Each of these positions makes
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yet a third claim, however, which the other does not.

This

difference is to be attributed to the way in which claim (1)
is construed in (R 5 ) and (R 6 ) respectively.

In (R ), as in
5

(R2 ), incorrigibility is held to be a synthetic feature of
phenomenal concepts, while in (R 6 ), as in (R 3 ), it is held
to be a necessary feature of these concepts.

Now to eliminate

from a concept one of its synthetic features would leave
that concept intact, although indeed it is doubtful whether
a concept whose great majority of synthetic features had been
eliminated would survive.

To eliminate from a concept one

of its necessary features, however, would be to eliminate
that concept.

It is a consequence of the way in which claim

(1) is construed in (R 5 ), accordingly, that the sort of empirical results postulated by claim (2) need not lead to the
elimination of our phenomenal concepts, while it is a consequence of the way in which claim (1) is construed in (R 6 )
that such results must lead to the elimination of these
concepts.

The sets of claims in which (R 5 ) and (R6 )

respectively consist are completed by statements that give
expression to these consequences. 1
1versions of (R ) can be found in the following writ1
ings: J. J. c. Smart, Philosophy and Scienti·f·ic Realism
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(New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 92-105; c. s.
Chihara and J.A. Fodor, 11 0perationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein," American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 281-295; P. E. Meehl, "The
Compleat Autocerebroscopist: A thought-Experiment on
Professor Feigl's Mind-Body Identity Thesis," in P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota.-P"ress, 1966);13. Aune, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature (New York: Random House, 1967), pp.
31-38; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind
(New York: Humanities Press, 1968). G. Sheridan-;-in "The
Electroencephelogram Argument against Incorrigibility,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 62-70,
defends a version of (R1) in which the latter is restricted
to the application of phenomenal concepts only in some circumstances but not in others; Sheridan suggests, however,
that the thesis of incorrigibility is not even true when
restricted to circumstances in which (Rl) does not hold,
since ~5) holds in such circumstances. For a statement and
defense of (R2), see A. J. Ayer, "Can There be a Private
Language?," in The Concept of~ Person and Other Essays
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 36-Sl, esp. pp.
49-50.
In a later essay, "Privacy," in ibid., pp. 52-81,
esp. pp. 68-73, Ayer defends essentially the same position,
although he makes a half-hearted gesture in the direction
of (R1). Ayer, of course, is not a materialist, but some
materiali~ts have thought his method of argument sufficient
to rebut certain arguments in favor of METI. See, for example, the use to which his argument has been put by R. Rorty,
"Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Inconununicability,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), pp. 192205, esp. pp. 201-02.
(R3) is not anywhere explicitly defended, although it is obviously a close relative of (R2).
Interestingly, it is P. F. Strawson who in an early article, his review of Philosophical Investigations, Mind, vol.
63 (1954), pp. 70-99, esp. pp. 83-89, came closest to enunciating (R3) (in conflict, I would argue, with other positions he later took about the mental) in criticism of what
he claimed was Wittgenstein's attempt to draw a certain
consequence about the logic of sensation-language from the
thesis of incorrigibility.
I suspect too that supporters
of (R6) rely on a tacit reference to ~3) for some of the
plausibility of their own position; it is a short (though
illegitimate) step from "contingent on the empirical facts"
to "contingent on the state of empirical inquiry."
(R4)
can be found in R. Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy,
and Categories," Review of Meta~hysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp.
24-54, esp. 41-48. H. Morick, in 11 Is Ultimate Epistemic
Authority a Distinguishing Characteristic of the Psychological?," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971),
pp. 292-95, also subscribes to (R4) by way of showing the
"merely tautological" character of the thesis of incorri. gibility, but distinguishes from the latter the (significant)
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thesis of "ultimate epistemic authority" which, he claims,
is consistent with the possibility of justifiably overriding
any given avowal of sensation. The clearest statements and
most vigorous defense of (R5) appear in H. Putnam's articles:
"Minds and Machines," in Dimensions of Mind, ed. s. Hook
(New York: New York University Pres$, 1960), pp. 148-79;
"The Analytic and the Synthetic," Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, III, ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell-(MinneapoliS: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp.
358-97; "Brains and Behavior" in Analytical Philosophy, II,
ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 1-19.
G. Sheridan, as earlier indicated, is also a supporter of
(R5).
(R6) was first introduced into the literature by
P. K. Feyerabend in "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,"
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 17 (1963), pp. 49-66. The general positron of which (R6) was a part was thereafter taken
up and elaborated upon by Rorty•in "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories" and applied by him to other features of
phenomenal concepts but, oddly, not to the feature of incorrigibility. In that article, as earlier indicated, Rorty
chose to rely on (R4) , apparently thinking that he had discovered an apodictic disproof of the significance of the thesis
of incorrigibility. In any case, Rorty seems to have abandoned (R4) in later articles and now seems to rely exclusively on (R6). See, for example, his article "Incorrigibility
as the Mark of the Mental," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67
(1970), pp. 399-424, pp. 416-18.
W. Sellars is often classified with the adherents of
(R6). See, for example, R. J. Bernstein, "The Challenge
of Scientific Materialism," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1968), pp. 252-75. Rorty 1 s repeated acknowledgement of debt to Sellars also carries the same suggestion.
I think, however, that this is mistaken. Rorty acknowledges
his debt to Sellars in a footnote to the following sentence:
"There is an obvious sense of 'same' in which what used to
be called 'a quantity of calorific fluid' is the ~thing
as what is now called a certain mean kinetic energy of molecules, but there is no reason to think that all features
truly predicated of the one may be sensibly predicated of
the other." ("Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,"
pp. 26-27). Rorty evidently understands Sellars here as
holding a view from which it follows that what people now
call "sensations" is in an obvious sense identical with
what will be referred to by some future expression whose
logic would permit or require the elimination of embarrassing
features demanded by the logic of present senation-language.
In view, however, of Sellar's insistence on the "relocation"
of raw feel universals, the "categorial transformation, but
not substantive reduction, of raw feel predicates," the
"transposing" of the "logical space" of raw feels ("The
Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem," Review of ~
physics, vol. 18 (1965), pp. 44.7-49), a more likely interpretation of his position would be that the features expressed
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Defenders of METI often proceed in a way which leaves
them particularly vulnerable to--indeed, almost invites-criticism along the lines of (R2 )-(R6 ).

The three facts men-

tioned in the passage I have used to introduce the thesis of
incorrigibility, for example, are said by Malcolm to be
"features of the 'grammar' of the word ['pain'], or of the
'language-game,' with the word. 111

Again, in his monograph

Dreaming, Malcolm claims t:he incorrigibility of first-person
dream reports to be "a matter of definition. 112

And in an

earlier essay restricted to a discussion of after-images,
he says that after-image reports are incorrigible in the
sense that under certain conditions
• • • there cannot be a question of his being in error
when he says 'I see an after-image.' There cannot be

by predicates true of what people now call "sensations" could
be (that is to say, it makes sense to suppose that they are)
identical with features which will be expressed by predicates
of an as yet to be elaborated theory of brain activity. The
sense of "identical" in question is the trivial sense in which
the features expressed by predicates true of what people now
call "sensations" are identical with currently unreduced psychic features of persons. This interpretation is supported
by Sellars' admission that he accepts only a non-controversial and unexciting version of the identity theory according
to which raw feel universals are trivially identical with
certain brain state universals. Sellars' position, so interpreted, however, seems to be at odds with (R6 ).
1.QE.. cit., p. 46.
2

(London:

Routledge

&Kegan

Paul, 1959), p. 81.
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a question of whether he 'takes' something to be·an
after-image that is really not one.I
The reason why there cannot be a question under certain conditions as to whether the assertion, "I see an after-image"
is mistaken, he argues, is that there is no way of finding
out the answer--not in the sense that there is some move
which it is possible to make, but which we for some reason
cannot make.

There is nothing we would call "finding out

the answer to such a question."

This assertion "might be

called 'self-confirming,' implying by this that really they
have no confirmation. 112

Cook offers a similar defense of

his claim that it makes no sense to speak of a person as not
being in as good a position as one could want for correctly
answering a certain question or making a certain statement
about his pain.
What is said to be senseless is not merely a combination of words but rather an attempt, by means of a
combination of words, to make in one language game a
move that belongs only to the other language game.3
Arguments of this type appear also in Shoemaker's defense
of the thesis of inocrrigibility.
That a [first-person present-tense phenomenal statement] is a sincere assertion is itself a logically
111 oirect Perception," in his Knowledge and Certainty
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 85.
2 Ib'.,

-~•I

p. 81.

3o

~·

. ...

~.,

p. ~.,00 •
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sufficient condition of its being true, and that ·such
a statement has been asserted with apparent sincerity
is itself criterial evidence that it is true.l
By "criterial evidence" for the truth of a judgment, Shoemaker means evidence which is such that "the assertion that
it is evidence in favor of the truth of the judgment
is necessarily (logically) rather than contingently (empirically} true."

2

I think that critics of ME.TI have been right to point
out the inadequacy of this type of

argument~

but I also

think that they have made things too easy for themselves by
ignoring other aspects of the incorrigibilist defense.

There

are clear indications in the writings of many incorrigibilists that they are themselves dissatisfied with such arguments and regard them as effective only within the context
of a more extended defense.

That incorrigibilists have in

mind a more extended defense is even suggested, apart from
such clear indications, by their position with respect
to (R2 }, (R 3 }, and the arguments by analogy often given in
support of (R 5 } and (R6 }.

So far from holding CR2 ) and (R 3 }

to be incompatible with MET!, they are among their most

1

2£.·

cit., p. 216.

2

Ibid., p. 4.
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vigorous advocates.

(R2 ) and (R 3 ) find expression, for

example, in Wittgenstein's remark
What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance, of a concept, are often
extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are
hardly ever mentioned because of their great generality. l
Shoemaker appeals to analogues of (R 2 ) and (R 3 ) dealing with
the concepts of perception and memory in the course of defending a thesis of (general) incorrigibility with respect
to first-person present-tense perceptual and memory statements. 2

And Malcolm shows his firm commitment to (R 2 ) and

(R 3 ) in the following passages:
Our concepts of sensation and emotion, of belief and
doubt, grow out of certain regular patterns of behavior
and circumstances that are frequently repeated in
human life.3
[Dream-telling is] a remarkable human phenomenon, a part
of the natural history of man, something given, the
foundation for the concept of dreaming.4
The plausibility of (R 5 ) and (R 6 ) rests, to a large extent,

1QE_. cit., p. 56.

See also sec. 142 and p. 230.

2 see op. cit., pp. 236-243.
311 The Privacy of Experience," p. 153.
4oreaming,
.
p. 87 •
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on arguments by analogy.

Putnam, for example, who is a vig-

orous partisan of (R5 ), argues by analogy with names of
diseases that "'pain' is a cluster-concept,"

by which he

means that "the application of the word 'pain' is controlled
by a whole cluster of criteria, all of which can be re. ~rded ~synthetic. 111

And Rorty, who could with reason be

counted among the chief architects of (R 6 ) , 2 argues by
analogy with demons, devils, Zeus's thunderbolts, and caloric
fluid that the future progress of psycho-physiology may lead
to the replacement of sensation discourse with brain-discourse.

3

Now none of the incorrigibilists mentioned above

have ever denied the facts of which these analogies are
based.

Such facts, indeed, are underscored in the philoso-

phy of Wittgenstein.

In an effort to distinguish clearly

111 Brains and Behaviour," in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (Second Series) (Oxford: Basil Blackwel~,
!%5), p. 5. See also "Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" in
R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (First Series)
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 218-221.
2Although Rorty explicitly uses (R4) to criticize METI,
there is a strong suggestion in his writings of criticism
along the lines of (R6). And the latter sort of criticism
seems to be a more natural development of his general position on the Mind-Body Identity Theory. Were he convinced
that (R4) was impotent against METI, I think it clear that
he would fall back on (RG).
3 see "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories."
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his own position from what he calls "logical behaviourism"
(under which title he seems to lump together the in many ways
widely divergent positions of Ryle, Strawson, Wittgenstein,
Wisdom, and Malcolm) , Putnam further explains his notion of
a "cluster-concept" as follows:
I mean not only that each criterion can be regarded
as synthetic, but also that the cluster is collectively synthetic, in the sense that we are free in certain
cases to say (for reason of inductive simplicity and
theoretical economy) that the term applies although the
whole cluster is missing. This is completely compatible with saying that the cluster serves to fix the
meaning of the word.l
How different is such a notion from Wittgenstein's doctrine
of family resemblances--so central to his philosophy--according to which a term can be extended gradually to cover cases
which have nothing at all in common with those it originally
covered? 2

Putnam uses his notion of a "cluster-concept"

against what he calls "the 'change of meaning' account,"
according to which any change of criteria involves a change
of meaning.

On such an account criteria for the presence

and character of phenomenal states which make it senseless
to suppose that a given person does not enjoy incorrigibility
vis-a-vis these states cannot be replaced by criteria

111 Brains and Behaviour," p. 5, n •

...

~See

op. cit., secs. 65-67.
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which do not make this supposition senseless without changing the meaning of phenomenal state terms.
meaning" account is a straw man.

The "change of

Neither Wittgenstein nor

Malcolm (against both of whom Putnam seems to be arguing)
held such a view.

Wittgenstein, on the contrary, explicitly

rejected the "change of meaning" account.

Arguing against

Russell, whom he takes to have held this view, he rejects
saying in certain cases that a term acquires a different
sense according as we assume one definition or another in
favor of saying in these cases that we use the term "without a fixed meaning." 1

By using terms "without a fixed

meaning," he is not talking about the ambiguity of terms
but about indeterminateness of meaning.

Changes in meaning

can occur without change of meaning in cases where meaning
is indeterminate.

That he intends to include scientific

terms, such as Putnam's names of diseases, among such cases
is clear from the remark he appends to his argument against
Russell:
The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon

1 Ibid., sec. 79.
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A will be tomorrow used to define 'A. 11
The facts about the use of scientific terms upon which Putnam bases his argument against the thesis of incorrigibility
were pointed out by Wittgenstein as early as 1933, when he
dictated the "Blue Book."

And, it is interesting to note,

he employed the very same examples of scientific terms to
which Putnam appeals in his support of (R5 ). 2
Doctors will use names of diseases without ever
deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria
and which as symptoms; and this need not be a deplorable lack of clarity. For remember that in general
we don't use language according to strict rules--it
hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. 3
Putnam cites no passages from Wittgenstein which might serve
as evidence that he ever held the "change of meaning" account.

Indeed, his attribution of this account to so-

called "logical behaviorists" in general seems to be based

1 Ibid. I have given here the literal translation of
Wittgenstein's remark, since I think the translator's rendering is misleading. Wittgenstein is talking about the
fluctuating definitions of terms, not of objects or events.
2 Putnam's use of the same examples may have been deliberate. If so, I think he may have misunderstood the point
Wittgenstein was trying to make by means of them, viz. that
fluctuating definitions of scientific terms do not lead
necessarily to change of meaning. If he did not misunderstand Wittgenstein's.point, then, on the assumption that his
use of these examples was deliberate, I have certainly misunderstood Putnam.
3The Blue and Brown Books, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford:
Basil -Blackwe1i";-T958), p. 25.
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solely.on passages taken from Malcolm's monograph Dreaming.
Let us examine very briefly two of these passages.
With adults and older children there are two criteria
of behaviour and [sinere] testimony; with animals and
human infants there is only the one criterion of behaviour. The concept of sleep is not exactly the same
in the two cases.I
Considering the radical conceptual changes that the
adoption of a physiological criterion of dreaming
would entail, it is evident that a new concept would
have been created that only remotely resembled the old
one.2
The point of the first passage, says Putnam, is that "there
are two concepts of sleep, because there are two methods
of verification. 113

Now, the italics notwithstanding, nothing

of significance turns on the issue of whether it is more
proper to speak of a concept
cept or as two concepts if

c1 and a concept c 2 as one con-

c 1 is not exactly the same as c 2 •

How we individuate concepts depends upon our criteria of
individuation, and our selection of the latter seems to be
.
.
4
a matter o f ar b itrary
c h oice.

1

P. 23.

2

What the first passage must

P. 81.

311 Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" p. 211.

4our ordinary concept of a person is indeterminate in
the respect that the criteria for its application leave
open the question of whether a four-month-old fetus is a
person. Suppose we introduce a criterion which further
determines our ordinary concept in this res·pect. Have we
now changed our ordinary concept of a person or have we
creat~d a ne'l.·1 concept of a person?
I am not suggesting,
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imply, or at least suggest, if it is to be evidence for a
"change of meaning" account which can bear the weight of arguments against (R5 ) is that in one of the cases the concept
for which the word "asleep" is used is not a concept of
sleep at all.

This is neither implied nor suggested. In-

deed, Malcolm implicitly rejects such a suggestion when, a
few lines later, he claims that "we should have two totally
different senses of 'alseep, 111

1

if behavior were not a cri-

terion of sleep in the case of adults and older children.
The second passage does imply that the word "dreaming" could
no longer be used for the concept of dreaming at all if its
application came to be determined by a physiological criterion.

But this is not because any change of criteria

involves a change of meaning but because this particular
change would entail "radical" conceptual changes.

The

other passages Putnam cites from Malcolm 2 as evidence that
the latter holds--or, at least, at one time held--the
"change of meaning" account are even less conclusive.

I do

of course, that the introduction of such a criterion would
be a matter of arbitrary choice.
1 oreaming, p. 24.

~"Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar,'" pp. 211-213.
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not think there is need to spend much time showing how truly
unimpressive to incorrigibilists are the arguments in support of (R6 ) based on the history of such concepts as
demons, devils, Zeus's thunderbolts, and caloric fluid.

Is

it to be supposed that incorrigibilists are unacquainted with
the phenomenon of the discovery, abandonment, and eventual
loss of a concept?

Wittgenstein takes note of this phenome-

non in the following remark:
• • • new types of language, new language-games, as we
may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten.I
That incorrigibilists strongly support some of the
views and readily accept the facts on which their critics
try to build a case against METI is a difficulty these critics seem to have overlooked.

To dismiss this difficulty as

just another indication of the inconsistency or, perhaps,
of the "consistent delusional system" 2 of "logical behaviorists" would be a mistake.

For it points the way to an

understanding of the extended defense of METI.

Generally,

the extended defense consists in arguments designed to show
that neither (R2 ) nor (R ) is incompatible with METI and
3
1

2E_. cit., sec. 23.

2 see Putnam, "Brains and Behaviour," p. 19.
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that (R5 ) and (R6 ) are both false. 1

More specifically,

it consists in arguments for two claims:

(1) neither (R2 )

nor (R 3 ) implies that any component of the thesis of incorrigibility is either a bare tautology or true in virtue of
linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of future
empirical inquiry, and (2) no component of the thesis of
incorrigibility is either a bare tautology or true in virtue of linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of
future empirical inquiry.
ceeds in two stages:

it

The general argument for (1) pro(~)

tries to make a case for dis-

tinguishing non-empirical truths which do not express a
necessary condition for the existence of our conceptual
scheme, such as "Demons are intangible" and "Epileptics
are under the spell of a demon," from non-empirical truths
which do express such a condition and (b) contends that the
latter are neither bare tautologies nor true in virtue of
linguistic conventions modifiable in the light of future
empirical inquiry.

The general argument for (2) is that the

thesis of incorrigibility expresses a necessary condition

1 That (R1) is false and that (R4) is not incompatible
with METI are generally assumed without argument. I do not
think it difficult, however, to construct good arguments for
both of these claims. I try to do so below.

129
for the existence of our conceptual scheme.
also proceeds in two stages:

it contends

(~)

This argument
that the con-

cept of a person is basic to our conceptual scheme and (b)
that the thesis of incorrigibility expresses a necessary condition for the existence of this concept.
Allusions to the extended defense are easily discernible in the writings of most of the incorrigibilists mentioned above.

Anscombe makes it clear, for example, how she

would defend her claim that there is no possibility of a person's being wrong in what he says about his pain against the
objection that a conflict between the two criteria of behavior and testimony is possible, and such a conflict,. since
the former criterion has greater weight than the latter,
would show a person to be wrong in what he says about his
pain.

She suggests that such a conflict would not show the

falsehood of what is said but would make what is said unintelligible. 1

This sort of reply, if intended to stand

alone, is of course vulnerable to criticism along the lines
of (R2 )-(R6 ).

That Anscombe intends this reply to be

understood within the context of the extended defense is

1.Qe.. cit., p. 14.
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indicated by the distinction she is careful to draw between
the unintelligibility of what is said and the unintelligibility of the person who says it.

In the case of such a

conflict, she explains while discussing an analogous situation, the person's words would be unintelligible, "not because one did not know what they meant, but because one could
not make out what the man meant by saying them
cannot understand such a man. 111

[W]e

That there is no possibil-

ity of a person's being wrong in what he says about his pain,
accordingly, is to be explained not be reference to what
pain is but by reference to what a person is.

One of the

clearest indications of the extended defense appears in the
recent essay by Malcolm from which I have taken the passage
used at the outset of this chapter to introduce the thesis
of incorrigibility.

Malcolm writes:

What I conceive to be a kind of explanation [of the grammar of sensation], and one that satisfies me, is to see
what the consequences would be for our concept of a
person, if the grammar of sensation (or of thinking
or intending) were different in the respect that the
expression of doubt, which has no place in the languagegame, ~ to have a place in it. 2

1 rbid., pp. 26-27.
211 The Privacy of Experience," pp. 151-152.
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The explanation [of why the expression of doubt is excluded from language] is that [it] could not fit coherently into the structure of our concept of a person.
The excluding it from working language is no superficial point of grammar or semantics, but a matter of
deep philosophical importance.l
Malcolm's appeal to the extended defense is not, as it may
perhaps appear to be, a recent development grafted onto his
former arguments for the sake of answering his critics.
There is evidence of such an appeal in his monograph Dreaming, apparently overlooked by Putnam in his severe criticism
of that work.

Malcolm's explanation of why the word "dream-

ing" could no longer be used for the concept of dreaming at
all if its application came to be determined by a physiological criterion is that
• • • what were then called 'dreams' would no longer
be of interest to poets, psychoanalysts, philosophers,
and to all of us, children and adults, who like a
strange tale. 2
What are now called "dreams" are of interest to poets,
psychoanalysts, etc., because a first-person dream-report
reveals important information about the person making the
report, beyond what it reveals about his behavior--his

1 rhid., pp. 154-155.
2

P. 81.
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"dreaming habits."

The consequence of adopting a physiologi-

cal criterion of dreaming is that a first-person dream-report
would not reveal information about anything beyond the behavior of the person making the report.

For the concept of

a person, according to Malcolm, is such that to reveal information about persons which go beyond information about their
behavior, first-person dream-reports must be incorrigible,
and the adoption of a physiological criterion of dreaming
would entail their corrigibility.

Thus the presupposition

of Malcolm's explanation is that the corrigibility of firstperson dream-reports which report what are now called
"dreams" could not fit coherently into the structure of our
concept of a person.

The elements of this explanation al-

ready appear in Wittgenstein's brief remarks on the concept
of dreaming.

Wittgenstein says:

Assuming that dreams can yield important information
about the dreamer, what yielded the information would
be truthful accounts of dreams. The question whether
the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reports the
dream after waking cannot arise, unless indeed we
introduce a completely new criterion for the reports
'agreeing' with the dream, a criterion which gives
us a concept of 'truth' as distinct from 'truthfulness' here.l

1

QE_. cit., pp. 222-223.
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That it would be possible to adopt a physiological criterion of dreaming seems to be suggested by this passage.

But

the criterion could be employed only where the question
whether the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reports
a dream after waking can arise.

And this question cannot

arise where our interest is in the dreamer rather than in
his behavior. 1

Allusions to the extended defense appear al-

so in Shoemaker's writings.

That Shoemaker intends his

arguments for the thesis of (general) incorrigibility with
respect to first-person present-tense perceptual and memory
statements to be understood within the context of the extended defense is indicated by the following passages, in
which he suggests that this thesis expresses a necessary
condition both for the existence of our conceptual scheme
and for the existence of the concept of a person.
It seems to me • • • that it follows from the logical
possibility of anyone's knowing anything about the
world that perceptual and memory beliefs are generally true. 2 • • • [If human beings lacked the capacity generally to make true perceptual and memory statements] they would not make perceptual and memory statements at all, could not be taught to make them, and
could not be said to have beliefs that are expressible
in. such statements.3

1 cf. ibid., pp. 179, 18~ and 190.
2op. cit., p. 235.

3 Ibid., p. 241.
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If a group of human beings could not be taught, or
trained, generally to make true perceptual and memory
statements, they could not be said to perceive or
remember at all in the sense in which persons do, and
could hardly be said to be persons at all.l
Shoemaker's arguments for the claims suggested in these
passages are taken up and further developed by Coburn in his
article cited earlier in which he defends the thesis of
incorrigibility by calling attention to a number of absurdities that are supposed to follow from denying it.
Failure to take account of the extended defense of METI
has vitiated much of the criticism directed against it.

Argu-

ments in favor of (R2 ) or (R 3 ) do nothing to show that METI
is incorrect unless they are accompanied by arguments which
show that either the general argument for claim (1) of the
extended defense or the general argument for claim (2) of
the extended defense is incorrect.

Now cogent arguments

in favor of (R 5 ) or (R6 ) would show that either one or both
of these general arguments are incorrect, since METI is
incompatible with both (R 5 ) and (R 6 ).

There are serious

objections to the arguments which have so far been given
in favor of (R5 ) and (R ), however, arising from considera6
tions relevant to the extended defense of METI.

1 rb·' ..
~·1 p. 239.

These
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are serious objections to the arguments which have so far
been given in favor of (R5 ) and (R 6 ), however, arising from
considerations relevant to the extended defense of .METI.
These objections seem to have been overlooked by most proponents of (R5 ) and (R 6 ); at least, few attempts have been
made to answer them.
ter 5.

I will take up (R5 ) and (R 6 ) in Chap-

In the remainder of this chapter, I want to con-

sider (R1 ) and (R 4 ).
Arguments in favor of (R1 ) are either based on Hume's
dictum that what is distinguishable is separable or consist
in bringing forward alleged counterexamples to the thesis of
incorrigibility, interpreted as a logical thesis.

All argu-

ments of the first sort take the following general form:
(H)

(1)

What is distinguishable is separable.

(2)

Phenomenal state x and the awareness of
phenomenal state x are distinguishable.

(3)

Therefore, phenomenal state

~

awareness of phenomenal state

and the
~

are

separable.
It follows from (3) that (at least) conjunct (£) of the
thesis of incorrigibility is false, since phenomenal state
x could exist in the absence of the awareness of phenomenal
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state~' and conversely. 1

J. J.

c. Smart and D. M. Arm-

strong, two prominent recent advocates of (R1 ), rely almost
exclusively on arguments of this sort to make out their case
for CR1 ).

2

The trouble with such arguments is that, as they

stand, they are all subject to reversal.

If, as incorrigi-

bilists maintain, the thesis of incorrigibility is true, then
either premise (1) of (H) is false or premise (2) of (H)
takes only false propositions as values.

What is needed are

further arguments for premises (1) and (2) , but these are
not provided.
evident.

Clearly, premises (1) and (2) are not self-

Consider premise (1).

A grin, if I may be permitted

to use one of Smart's own examples 3 (borrowed from Lewis
Carroll) against him, is distinguishable but not separable
from the mouth in the shape of a grin.

If they were not dis-

tinguishable, then whatever is true of the grin would be
true of the mouth in the shape of a grin.

But, first, it

1 For convenience, I am here departing from the ordinary
use of the term "awareness," according to which "A is aware
of x" implies "There is an x of which A is aware." Nothing
in my argument turns on this extended use of the term.
2 see Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 100, and Armstrong, A
Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1968), pp. 106-107.
')

~Ibid.

I

p. 4.
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is true of the grin that it could only have been ascribed to
a living being, but this is not true of the mouth in the
1
.
s h ape o f a grin.

Second, it is true of the grin that it

could only have been ascribed to a person, but this is not
true of the mouth in the shape of a grin.

The obvious objec-

tion here is that in a fairy tale the cat too can grin.

There

is an obvious reply, however; it is that the grinning cat
can also talk.

The cat becomes a possible subject of grin-

ascriptions by being made to resemble a person. 2

Third,

it is true of the grin that it requires "surroundings," but
this is not true of the mouth in the shape of a grin.

Thus,

the mouth of a grimacing person could be correctly said to
be in the shape of a grin in surroundings which rule out
the possibility of a grin-ascription. 3
Armstrong supports

(R )

1

by an argument which, he says,

"is meant to be an apodeictic disproof of the thesis of
indubitability. 114

The "thesis of indubitability" is the

1 cf. Wittgenstein, S?.E· cit., secs. 284-285.
2cf. ibid., secs. 281-282.
3cf. ibid., secs. 536-539, 583, and 652.
4

cf. ~* cit. , p. 106.
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title Armstrong gives to the claim that propositions ascribing phenomenal states are logically indubitable for the persons whose phenomenal states they are, where he defines "E.
is logically indubitable for A" as follows:
(i)

A believes E

(ii)

(A's belief that

E.)

logically implies (E,) • 1

Thus Armstrong's thesis of indubitability is a version of
what I have called the "thesis of incorrigibility," got from
the latter by eliminating conjuncts

(~)

ing conjunct (c) as a logical thesis.

and (b) and interpretThe following is his

"apodeictic disproof" of the thesis of indubitability.
• • • let us consider the mechanical analogue of awareness of our own mental states; the scanning by a mechanism of its own internal states. It is clear here that
the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must
be 'distinct existences.' • • • Consider an eye
(taken solely as a mechanism) scanning itself by means
of a mirror. Certain features of the eye, such as
its color and shape, will register on the eye. But
the registering will have to be something logically
distinct from the features that are registered • • • •
Why should the substitution of spiritual for material
substance abolish the need for a distinction between
object and subject? I must admit that I can see no way
to prove that there must be such a parallelism, which
is a lacuna in my argument. But it seems clear that
the natural view to take is that pain and awareness of
pain are 'distinct existences.' If so, a false awareness of pain is at least logically possible.2
Armstrong employs here an argument by analogy with self-

1

IJ:?id., p. 101.

2 rbid., pp. 106-07.
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scanning mechanisms based on the logical distinction between
object and subject, between the "being acted on," and the
"acting on," to establish the universal generalization of
step (2) in (H) above, from which he infers the universal
. generalization of step (3) in (H).

The argument is thus

an enthymeme whose suppressed premise is step (1) in (H)
and which, when fully stated, would take the form of {H).
Armstrong, like Smart, sees no need to support step (1).
Yet, Armstrong's own example, like Smart's example earlier,
seems under closer scrutiny to indicate that step (1) is
far from self-evident.

If step (1) were self-evident, then

. granting that the "registering" of color and shape on the
eye is logically distinct from the color and shape registered, it would also be self-evident that they were "distinct existences."

But much of the philosophy of percep-

tion consists in arguments designed to show either that
they are "distinct existences" or that they are not.

And

there are philosophers on opposite sides of the issue who
share in common the view that there is some sort of logical
distinction between them.
Armstrong's example of an eye scanning itself casts
doubt even on the self-evidence of ste_p (2).

Clearly, it
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is not self-evident in the case of a self-scanning eye--or
even in the case of an eye scanning something other than
itself--that the color "registered" is related to the activity of the eye as object to subject, as "being acted on"
to "acting on."

To maintain that it is self-evident is

to beg the question against the adverbial view of perception, according to which colors, sounds, smells, etc., are
not objects of perception at all but only ways of perceiving.

This view is not lightly to be dismissed; its creden-

tials are impressive and go back at least as far as Descartes, who considered colors, sounds, smells, etc. to be no
more than

11

modes 11 of thought. 1

Now sentences ascribing

phenomenal states such as pain are even more plausible candidates for adverbial analysis; indeed, it is part of the adverbial view of perception that feeling pain is just another
way of perceiving.
(2)

of

(H)

If the adverbial view is correct, step

takes only false propositions as values.

There

is no need on this view for a distinction between, for
example, feeling a pain and the pain felt, just as there is
no need for a distinction between dancing a jig and the jig

1

see Meditations, III, and Principles of Philosophy, I,
65 (HR, I, 160, 161 and 246).
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danced.
The arguments in favor of (R1 ) which consist in bringing
forward alleged counterexamples to the thesis of incorrigibility, interpreted as a logical thesis, seem to me to suffer from one or the other of two general failings.

In the

guise of "inferences" from a set of propositions describing
conceivable or actual situations, exponents of these arguments are in fact proposing either re-descriptions of phenomena which are presently described in some other way or
descriptions for phenomena which are so abnormal that it is
at present doubtful how they are to be described.

To defend

this claim satisfactorily, it would be necessary to examine
all such arguments individually.
an impossible task.

This, of course, would be

It will be useful, however, to glance

at a few such arguments, to see how they are affected by
these failings.

Consider the three alleged counterexamples

offered by Bruce Aune, a prominent advocate of (R1 ) who does
not rely on Humean-type arguments, in his recent book, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature. 1

Aune takes his three counterexam-

ples to establish not merely that the thesis of incorrigibility

1 (New York:

Random House, 1967), pp. 31-38.
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is false if interpreted as a logical thesis, but false even
if interpreted as expressing a de facto universality.
They establish, he claims, that this thesis is false insofar
as it is meant to express anything more than an extremely
high probability restricted to normal conditions. 1

Aune

bases his first counterexample on "the verbal behavior of
hebephrenic schizophrenics," people who "pour out chaotic
jumbles of words, which often appear to be utterly unrelate d • .. 2

He regards the total confusion of such behavior as

evidence that the conscious thinking of these people is also
totally confused and this, in turn, as evidence that they
make mistaken identifications of even their own feelings
and mental images.

It should be clear, I think, that this

argument suffers from the first general failing mentioned
above.

Chaotic jumbles of thoughts are no more to be count-

ed as the making of identifications, much less the making
of mistaking identifications, then are chaotic jumbles of
words.

In his second argument, Aune describes a possible

experiment in which a man gives a self-contradictory report
of his present mental image.

Upon being asked to read off

the image he claims to have from his recent scrutiny of

,

·see ibid., p. 37.

2

Ibid.

I

p. 33.
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the letter-square
e m f

r z a
0 w p
the man makes, sincerely and with confidence, the following
three assertions:
1.
2.

3.

The image did not change during the experiment.
From left to right, top to bottom, the letters
were: e, m, f, r, z, a, o, w, p.
From right to left, bottom to topi the letters
were: p, w, o, E. 1 ~' ~, f, m, e.

Aune infers from the inconsistency of this sequence of assertions that the man must be mistaken either about the
existence of the image he claims to have or about its character.
Now, if he has the image he claims to have, not all
three of these assertions can be true of it; at least
one must be mistaken. Whichever it is, we know that
he has made a mistake about the character of his experience. 2
This argument appears to suffer from the second general failing mentioned above.

Clearly, Aune's "inference" is not

the only possible one in the circumstances.

One could just

as well infer that, although each assertion individually
can serve as the report of a mental image, the whole sequence
of assertions does not constitute the report of anything, much
1 rbid., pp. 34-35.
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less the mistaken report of a mental image.

Any preference

for one inference over the other would be entirely arbitrary.
The counterexample Aune offers in his third argument is
based on some of the experiments actually performed on con. genitally blind adults whose vision has been restored by
surgery.

These patients, it was found, often have an ex-

tremely difficult time visually discriminating squares from
triangles and even spheres from' cubes.

Aune infers from the

mistakes they make in visually discriminating physical shapes
that they must be making mistakes in discriminating their
visual impressions.
Though the shapes in point were physical ones, an
empiricist could scarcely deny that the patients
had the appropriate visual impressions.l
The failing of this argument is harder to classify.

It

falls somewhere between the first and second general failings.

On the one hand, the reply might be that one could

just as well infer that these

patients are experiencing

chaotic jumbles of visual impressions which only after
a period of time first become "appropriate" for discriminating physical shapes.

1 rbid., p. 36.

On the other hand, this "inference"
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would seem to be the more natural one to make, in view of
the similarity of such phenomena to the symptoms of vertigo.
Consider now the criticism of METI which takes the form
of (R 4 ).

The force of (R 4 ) is that the thesis of incorri-

. gibility does nothing to show that persons are in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-a-vis their own current
phenomenal states, because one of its crucial components,
conjunct

£ is a bare tautology.
1

(R4 ) alone, however, does

not imply the lack of epistemic and, hence, metaphysical significance of the thesis of incorrigibility.

That sincere

reports of something about which it is impossible to be mistaken can nevertheless justifiably be over-ridden does not
imply that the statement expressing this impossibility is a
bare tautology.

Indeed, incorrigibilists have not denied

that one's sincere reports of one's own current phenomenal
states can justifiably be over-ridden but, on the contrary,
have tried to show that they can.

Anscombe suggests, as I

noted earlier, 1 that although a conflict between the two
criteria of behavior and testimony would not show a person
to be wrong in what he says about his pain, it would make

1

See supra, pp. 129-30.

146
what he says unintelligible.
also.

1

This is a point Malcolm makes

The clearest indication of Malcolm's position regard-

ing (R 4 ) appears in his essay on after-images in which (R4 )
is explicitly affirmed and defended by appeal to several
kinds of cases in which it would be justifiable to over-ride
first-person present-tense after-image reports.
When I say that [after-image descriptions and reports]
are 'incorrigible' I do not imply • • • that anything
whatever that is offered as a description of an afterimage should be accepted without question. If it were
self-contradictory we should not regard it as a perfectly good, although unusual, description of an afterimage. If we found that someone constantly misused
certain color adjectives in his descriptions of physical
realities, then we should not accept at face value his
after-image descriptions containing those adjectives.
If there was any language at all whose use in relation
to physical realities he had not mastered, then we
should disallow his use of it in an alleged after-image
report.2
That Wittgenstein would also subscribe to (R 4 ) is clear from
his remark that if someone said "'Oh, I know what 'pain'
means; what I don't know is whether this, that I have now,
is pain'--we should merely shake our heads and be forced to
regard his words as a queer reaction which we have no idea
to do with. 113

The critics of .METI who rely on (R 4 ), however,

1 see "The Privacy of Experience," p. 136.
211 Direct Perception," p. 83.
3QE_. cit., sec. 288.
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do not intend that (R 4 ) be considered alone.
considered together with a certain argument in its favor.
In the light of this argument, it is maintained, (R 4 ) does
imply the lack of epistemic and, hence, metaphysical significance of the thesis of incorrigibility.

The argument in

question is a version of what has come to be called the
"electroencephalogram (EEG) argument."

This version of the

EEG argument was originally formulated by Rorty 1 and has
recently been revived by Harold Morick. 2

Since Morick's

formulation of the argument adds nothing to Rorty's but on
the contrary is only a highly compressed version of it, I
will focus my remarks on Rorty's original formulation.
The argument begins with the claim that advances in
physiology and electroencephalography which resulted in a
well-confirmed theory correlating brain-processes with
phenomenal states would lead to a situation in which the

111 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," pp. 41-

48.
211 Is Ultimate Epistemic Authority a Distinguishing Char-

acteristic of the Psychological?," American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 292-293. Although Morick tries
to show in this article that the EEG argument establishes
less than its proponents think it does, he-takes it to
establish the "merely tautological" character of conjunct £
of the thesis of incorrigibility.
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"'final epistemological authority•

[of sincere first-per-

son present-tense reports of phenomenal states] would be
. gone, for there would be a standard procedure for overriding our reports. 111

The next step is a reply to a certain

objection which incorrigibilists are expected to raise
against this claim.

This objection consists in asserting

conjunct £ of the thesis of incorrigibility together with
the claim that conjunct £ is incompatible with the possibility of justifiably over-riding sincere first-person present-tense reports of phenomenal states. 2

The reply to this

objection is that a person's sincere reports can justifiably
be over-ridden not only if there is good reason to think
that they are false but also if there is good reason to
think that he does not understand the words he is using, and
in the situation envisaged there could be good reason to
think that someone does not know how to use phenomenal state
terms correctly. 3

It is in the course of this reply that an

1QE.. cit., p. 47.
2 To expect incorrigibilists to make such an objection,
as I have just indicated, shows a fundamental misunderstanding of their position.
3That such a truism should be thought·to be an effective reply to the incorrigibilist position I find most puzzling. Incorrigibilists would simply grant it and add that
even in the present situation there could be good reason
to think that someone does not know how to use phenomenal
state terms correctly.
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argument appears for the merely tautological character of
conjunct c.

The argument is restricted to the case of pains

but is meant to apply generally to all sensations.

The

heart of this argument is contained in the following passage:
• the claim that 'such a mistake is inconceivable'
is an ellipsis for the claim that a mistake, made by
one who knows what pain is, is inconceivable, for only
this expanded form will entail that when Jones and
the encephalograph disagree, Jones is always right.
But when formulated in this way out infallibility
about our pains can be seen to be empty. Being infallible about something would be useful only if we could
draw the usual distinction between misnaming and misjudging, and, having ascertained that we were not misnaming, know that we were not misjudging. But where
there are no criteria for misjudging (or to put it more
accurately, where in the crucial cases the criteria
for misjudging turn out to be the same as the criteria
for misnaming), then to say that we are infallible
is to pay ourselves an empty compliment.I
The argument in this passage may be set out as follows:
The statement

s1 :

P (a person) cannot be mistaken in thinking that
he has a pain

is elliptical for

s2 :

If P knows what "pain" means, P cannot be mistaken in thinking that he has a pain.

Rorty calls

s2

"empty" and implies that it is "useless."

Morick speaks of

s2

1 Ibid., p. 45.

---

as "merely tautological," "analytic,"
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and "trivial."

(1)

Let

s2 is trivially true

represent these claims.

Now Rorty claims that (1) follows

from
(2)

There is no distinction between misnaming and
misjudging in the case of "I am in pain,

11

which, in turn, follows from either
(3)

There are no criteria for misjudging in the case
of "I am in pain"

or
(4)

The criteria for misjudging are the same as the
criteria for misnaming in the case of

II

I am in

pain. 11
( 4)

I

Rorty says, is only a "more accurate" version of ( 3) •

To support (3) and ( 4)

I

Rorty describes a case which, he

claims, shows that (3) and (4) are both true.

In this

case someone who has not been burned before exhibits painbehavior while being burned but sincerely denies that he
feels pain.

"But, now as in the past, he both exhibits

pain-behavior and thinks that he feels pain when he is
frozen, stuck, struck, racked, etc. 111
1

Ibid.

I

p. 44.

When he is told
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that what he feels when he is burned is also called "pain,"
II

he admits that he does feel something, but insists that what
he feels is quite different from what he feels when he is

stuc~ struck, etc. 111
I want to examine this argument.
ing into question Rorty's claim that
82 •

I will begin by call-

s 1 is elliptical for

Rorty supports this claim, as the quoted passage shows,

by maintaining that 8 1 is held because it is thought to entail
83:

Whenever P thinks that he has a pain, P is right.

8 1 , however, does not as it stands entail 8 3 •

Only when 8 1

is expanded to s 2 is this entailment secured.

Rorty is

partly right and partly wrong.

It is true that 8 1 does not

entail 8 3 , but neither does s 2 entail 8 3 •

8 2 is clearly

consistent with
84:

P is wrong in thinking that he has a pain.

For P may not know what "pain" means.

Rorty's mistake is one

1 rbid. Rorty supposes this case to occur at a time
when there is a well-confirmed theory correlating brainprocesses with pains.
The existence of such a theory,
however, is an inessential feature of the case. For Rorty,
like Morick, does not hold that our inability to be mistaken
about our pains is relative to a given stage of empirical
inquiry, although, unlike Morick, he holds that our "final
epistemological authority" is so relative (see ibid., p.
47).

--
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s 1 does entail s 3 provided that

of bracketing incorrectly.

s5 :

P knows what "pain" means.

But this should not be construed as asserting

but rather

Now the second expression is indeed equivalent to

So we could say, were we to grant that s 1 is held because
it is thought to entail

(s 5

•

s 1 ).

But since

s 3 , that s 1 is elliptical for

(s 5

•

s 1 ) is clearly not trivial, we

could not then go to say that s 1 is elliptical for .a trivial
assertion.
There are other difficulties with Rorty's argument.
It is important to notice that

(2)

is ambiguous.

(2)

can

be understood to mean either
(5)

The distinction between misnaming and misjudging
does not apply to "I am in pain 111

or

1 Morick understands (2) in this sense.
p. 292.

See op. cit.,
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(6)

To misname is to misjudge in the case of "I am
in pain. 111

Consider (5).

Although (5) does follow from either (3) or

(4), (1) does not follow from (5).

If (1) did follow from

(5), one could argue analogously that
(7)

"If N (a number) is not red, N cannot be even"
is trivially true

follows from
(8)

The distinction between being red and being even
does not apply to.numbers.

Replacing (5) by (6) does not help the argument in this regard and indeed adds to its difficulties.
(1) follow from (6).
(9)

For neither does

Otherwise, one could argue that

"If X is not the Evening Star, X cannot be the
Morning Star" is trivially true

follows from
(10)

The Evening Star is the Morning Star.

Further, (6) does not follow from (3).

This form of argument

1 Rorty seems to vacillate between these two ways of understanding (2). His asserting (3) suggests that he understands (2) in the sense of (5), but his asserting (4) sug. gests that he understands (2) in the sense of (6).
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permits the inference from
(11)

There are no criteria for being red in the case
of (the number) "2"

to
(12)

To be even is to be red in the case of (the number) "2."

Now (6) does follow from (4).

But Rorty's argument in favor

of (4) is at best a weak one and at worst irrelevant.

One

cannot establish that the criteria for the application of a
description d 1 are the same as the criteria for the application of a description d 2 by citing cases in which the criteria do not determine which of d 1 or d 2 is to be preferred.
The case Rorty presents us with, however, does not even seem
to be of this sort but rather one in which the phenomena
are so abnormal that it is doubtful whether either d 1 or
d 2 has an application or one in which, since there is a conflict of criteria (for being in pain), no description has an
application other than "the phenomena are unintelligible."

CHAPTER V
INCORRIGIBILITY AND THE EEG ARGUMENT
One of the ways in which proponents of the Mind-Body
Identity Theory have replied to objections based on the
thesis of incorrigibility is to challenge the significance
of this thesis.

The four general positions I have called

R1 -R 4 are different forms this challenge has taken.

R -R
1 3

are supported by Humean arguments, arguments by analogy,
and alleged counterexamples to the thesis of incorrigibility
and R4 by the electroencephalogram (EEG) argument.

In Chap-

ter IV, I examined these arguments and alleged counterexamples and concluded that they fell short of establishing the
positions they support.

A second line of reply to objections

based on the thesis of incorrigibility is that it would be
reasonable in the light of future scientific advances to
eliminate in principle incorrigibility in.the sense in which
it cannot be a feature of physiological statements.

The

. general positions I have called Rs and R6 are different forms
of this reply.

Identity Theorists rely almost entirely on

the EEG argument to make out their case for Rs and R6 •
In the present chapter, I will try to show that the EEG
argument does not establish either of these positions or even

lSS
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provide some reason for thinking that one of them is true.
There will be no need to consider these positions separately,
for my argument is intended to show that the EEG argument
does not establish or even provide some reason for thinking
true one of the two claims essential to both positions, viz.,
that additions to our stock of empirical knowledge together
with advances in technology could lead to the elimination
in principle of the feature of incorrigibility. 1

I will

conclude my discussion by considering whether any argument
could establish or provide some reason for thinking that this
claim is true.

Respecting this question, I will argue that

the logical differences between explanation-types pointed
out in Chapters II and III which make doubtful the possibility of eliminating sensation-statements also make doubtful the
possibility of eliminating incorrigibility as a feature of
these statements.

Heretofore the issue of incorrigibility

has been debated as if it were decidable independently of
considerations pertaining to the logical similarities and
differences between explanation-types.

No really important

philosophical issue can be decided, however, independently
1
For an account of the claims common to both R5 and R6
and peculiar to each, see supra, Chapter IV, pp. 113-14.
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of the way in which a great many other philosophical issues
are decided.

One of my aims is to show that incorrigibility

is such an issue.
As things are, say proponents of the EEG argument, no
one can be in a position to override a person's honestly
avowed reports about the existence and character of his own
current sensations.

That no one can be in such a position,

however, is merely contingent on the present state of empirical inquiry.

There are no accepted procedures by applying

which it would be rational to override a person's honest
avowal of sensation.

Advances in physiology and technology,

however, could lead to a well-confirmed theory correlating
sensations with brain processes.

In such circumstances, it

is claimed, it would be rational to override a person's honest avowal of sensation on the basis of a conflicting EEG
report (provided there was not a sizable accumulation of
conflicts between similar avowals of other people and EEG
reports).

To say that it would be rational to override such

an avowal, of course, does not rule out the possibility that
the avowal might be correct after all.
There are serious difficulties with the foregoing position •. I want to discuss two such difficulties.

The fi£st
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is not serious in itself but nevertheless deserves some attention, since it is connected with what is, I think, an
obviously mistaken view of our epistemic position vis-a-vis
our own current sensations.

The second deserves a great

deal more attention and will occupy most of the discussion
in this chapter.

The first difficulty is this.

It is not

true that as things are no one can be in a position to override a person's honestly avowed reports about the existence
and character of his own current sensations.

There are

criteria whose satisfaction establishes that a word is being
used incorrectly, and anyone who is in a position to observe
that these criteria have been satisfied on a certain occasion is in a position to override the report made by using
the word on that occasion.

It might be thought that this

difficulty can be easily removed by adding a proviso to the
original assertion:

As things are no one can be in a posi-

tion to override a person's honestly avowed reports about
the existence or character of his own current sensations,
if that person is granted mastery of the words used to make
these reports.

The trouble with this suggestion, however,

is that some proponents of the EEG

argurnen~

hold the view

that anycnc ·who grants a person mastery of the words he uses
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to make honestly avowed reports of his own current sensations is logically precluded from rejecting or even doubting these reports, because it is "merely tautological" that
a mistake about one's own current sensations made by one who
knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is inconceivable •
• • • 'such a mistake is inconceivable' is elliptical
for 'such a mistake made ~~who knows what 'pain'
means is inconceivable.' And that assertion is merely
tautological • • • • 1
~~
If these proponents of the EEG argument are right, the
assertion resulting from adding the proviso "if that person
were granted mastery of the words used to make these reports"
expresses not only how things are but how they always were
and always will be.

For surely if our present epistemic

position vis-a-vis our own current sensations is grounded
in a mere tautology, no changes in the world whatever could
lead to any change in this position.

But the purpose of the

EEG argument is to show how some changes in the world could

1

Harold Morick, "Is Ultimate Epistemic Authority a
Distinguishing Characteristic of the Psychological?," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), p. 292. See
also Richard Rorty, 11 Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Cate-.
gories," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 19 (1965), pp. 45-46.
Although Mor1ck claims not to be a proponent of the EEG
argument, he accepts the version of this argument sketched
above~
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lead to a change in this position.

So the proponents of the

EEG argument who hold it to be merely tautological that a
mistake about one's own current sensations made by one who
knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is inconceivable seem to be caught in a dilemma.

Either the EEG

argument is intended to show how someone could be in a position to override a person's honestly avowed reports about
his own current sensations, in which case it is unnecessary.
For as things are someone could be in such a position.

Or

it is intended to show how someone could be in a position
to override a person's honestly avowed reports about his own
current sensations even when that person is granted mastery
of the words used to make these reports, in which case the
argument is useless.

For such a position is logically im-

possible in the sense that the statement describing it is
self-contradictory.
The argument against the second horn of the dilemma
has evidently appeared so compelling as to outweigh the
considerations against the first, for the philosophers in
question are content to put forward the EEG argument as
one intended to show how someone could be in a position to
override a person's honestly avowed reports about his own
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current sensations.

Now it seems on the face of it not

self-contradictory to assert that someone could be in a
position to override a person's honest avowal of his own
current sensations even when that person is granted mastery
of the language.

And, indeed, I think it is this view

which must be rejected to preserve the significance of the
EEG argument.

This view, as we have seen, rests on the

claim that it is merely tautological that a mistake about
one's own current sensations made by one who knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is inconceivable.
What is the argument for this claim?

It is that the distinc-

tion between verbal and factual error does not apply to a
person's honest avowals of his own current sensations.
• since the distinction between verbal and factual
error, between misnaming and misjudging, doesn't apply
to 'I am in pain,' it follows analytically that if a
person knows what 'pain' means he cannot mistake}?ain
for something else nor something else for pain.l
Now this by itself does not establish the correctness of
the claim.

The argument would be valid only if it were

also merely tautological that the distinction between
verbal and factual error does not apply to a person's honest
avowals of his own current sensations.
l,r

• •

~oricK,

pp. 43-44.

~·

cit., p. 292.

But I do not see

See also Rorty, !?.E.· cit.
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that it is.

The argument given for the lack of such a dis-

tinction is that there are no criteria whose satisfaction
would establish that someone using a sensation-word correctly on a certain occasion to make an honest report about his
own current sensation is mistaken or, as it is sometimes
put, that the criteria whose satisfaction would establish
that someone who makes a report about his own current sensation on a certain occasion is mistaken are the same as the
criteria whose satisfaction would establish that the relevont sensation-word is being used incorrectly on that cecasion •
• • • where there are no criteria for misjudging (or
to put it more accurately, where in the crucial cases
the criteria for misjudging turn out to be the same
as the criteria for misnaming), then to say that we
are infallible is to pay ourselves an empty compliment.!
But clearly it is not merely tautological that there are
no criteria for factual error in the case of honest reports
of one's own current sensations or that the criteria for
factual error turn out in this case to be the same as the
criteria for verbal error.

These are contingent facts.

That the distinction between verbal and factual error does

1

Rorty, ibid., p. 45.
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not apply to a person's honest avowals of his own current
sensations, therefore, is also a contingent fact and so cannot legitimately be used to support the claim that it is
merely tautological that a mistake about one's own current
sensations made by one who knows the meaning of the words
for these sensations is inconceivable.
It may appear that the purpose of the foregoing argument is to show that it is conceivable that a mistake about
one's own current sensations made by one who knows the meaning of the words for these sensations is conceivable.
a way this is right.

In

But it should be noticed that in this
'

reformulation of the intended conclusion, the word "conceivable" is being used to express different notions in its two
occurrences.

The intended conclusion could be restated

in the following way so as to bring out the ambiguity:

It

is not self-contradictory for someone to be in a position
to override a person's honestly avowed reports about his
own current sensations even when that person is granted
mastery of the words used to make these reports.

That no

one can be in such a position is based on the contingent
fact that there are no criteria whose satisfaction would
establish that someone using a sensation word correctly on a
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certain occasion to make an honest report about his own
current sensation is mistaken.
With this shift from "merely tautological" to "merely
based on a contingent fact," the EEG argument acquires not
only significance but also force and persuasiveness.

If it

is a contingent fact that there are no criteria of the kind
in question, then surely there could come to be such criteria.
And it is the purpose of the EEG argument to describe circumstances in which it would be reasonable to introduce
them.

I do not think, however, that the circumstances de-

scribed by the EEG argument are ones in which it would be
any more reasonable to introduce such criteria than the present circumstances.

That our epistemic position vis-a-vis

our own current sensations is merely based on a contingent
fact does not imply that this position is merely contingent
on the present state of empirical inquiry.

And there is

a serious difficulty with the view that our epistemic position vis-a-vis our own current sensations is merely contin. gent on the present state of empirical enquiry, which becomes
apparent upon an examination of the EEG argument.
difficulty is this.

The

According to the EEG argument, in cir-

cumstances in which there is a well-confirmed theory
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correlating sensations with brain processes, it would be
rational to override a person's honest avowal of sensation
on the basis of a conflicting EEG report (provided there
was not a sizeable accumulation of conflicts between similar
avowals of other people and EEG reports).
diately arises:

The question imme-

Why should we not rather conclude that the

theory is defective?

Even a well-confirmed set of psycho-

physical correlation laws must be open to empirical disconfirma:tion.

It is indeed the recognition of this point that lies

behind the proviso that "there was not a sizeable accumulation of conflicts between similar avowals of other people and
EEG reports."

The requirements that correlation laws be

open to empirical disconfirmation seems also to underlie
Morick's thesis that a person's honest avowal of his own current psychological state cannot possibly be overridden by
any evidence which is not supported by other such avowals
from a sufficient number of overall competent speakers of
.
t ances. 1
. the same circums
th e 1 anguage in

But I do not see

why nothing can count as a disconf irmatory instance of a
correlation law unless it is accompanied by other disconfirmatory instances.

If a certain piece of metal were discovered

see ~· cit., pp. 294-95.

1
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to have all the known properties of copper except high electrical conductivity, it would surely not be irrational to
count it as a disconfirmatory instance of the law "Copper
is a good electrical conductor."

It would be possible, of

course, to decide not to count the piece of metal as
copper, but there seems to be no good reason for holding such
a decision to be

~

rational than, say, the decision to

count it as a new kind of copper.

But, it may be objected,

the psycho-physical correlations of the EEG argument are not
mere empirical generalizations like, "Copper is a good electrical conductor."

They are part of a well-confirmed theory

which explains and exhibits systematic connections between
a wide variety of empirical generalizations about inner
states and thus deals with a more extensive range of
phenomena than does any given empirical generalization.
The theory, moreover, is one from which more precise predictions concerning inner states may be obtained and continually suggests new empirical laws which subsequently prove to
be correct.

Now there is good reason, the objection con-

cludes, to hold that a theory so central to current scientific explanations cannot be broken down at one blow.

But

why should it be thought to follow from this that a correlation which figures as part of the theory cannot be broken
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down at one blow?

That a theory is central to current scien-

tific explanations does not imply that every part of the
theory is also central to current scientific explanations.
And a theory of such great generality as is here envisaged
has little to fear from the acknowledgement that it is defective in one of its parts.

It would have something to fear,

of course, from the acknowledgement of a defect which involved the breakdown of a fundamental assumption of the theory.

But clearly a law correlating, say, pain with a certain

kind of brain process would not be a fundamental assumption
of this theory.

Nor need the falsification of such a law

involve the breakdown of a fundamental assumption.

A law

correlating pain with a certain kind of brain process could
be false if the set of initial or boundary conditions mentioned in its antecedent was not sufficient to exclude
feelings closely resembling pain.

And it might in fact be

the case that the person whose honest avowal conflicts with
an EEG report is the only person who ever had such feelings.
The recognition of such a case need not lead to the breakdown of the theory or one of its fundamental assumptions,
although it would prompt a search after the relevant difference or differences between the anomalous case and all
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other cases so far observed.
It may be objected that in any isolated case of conflict between a person's honest avowal and an EEG report
in the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument, we could
conclude that the person is making a verbal mistake.

Regard-

ing the expressions "pain" and "seems to me as if I were
seeing something red," Rorty writes:
• • • the device which we should use to justify ourselves [in overriding sincere reports using these
predicates in certain imaginable situations]--is one
which can apply in all [Rorty's italics] proposed
cases • • • • this escape-hatch is always available,
and • • • the question of whether the reporter does
know how to use the word or does not is probably not
itself a question which could ever be settled by recourse to any absolute epistemological authority • • • • 1
This objection seems confused.

In Rorty•s statement of the

objection, I think it important to ask what he means by
"this escape-hatch is always available."

Does he mean sim-

ply that the device to which he alludes is one which can
apply in all proposed cases of introspective reports?
so, then he is surely right.

If

But this does not imply that

it would be rational to apply the device in any proposed
case of this kind.

1

Does he mean then that it would be

QE_. cit., p. 51.

169
rational to apply the device in any proposed case of this
kind?

If so, then he is wrong.

For clearly there are some

cases of introspective reports in which it would be not merely less rational to apply the device than not to apply it,
but not rational to apply the device at all.

Such cases

are ones in which it has been established with certainty that
the reporter doesknow how to use the relevant words.
surely there are such cases.

And

I do not know what Rorty

means by an "absolute epistemological authority" by recourse
to which the question of whether the reporter does know how
to use the relevant words or does not could be settled.
But there are criteria whose satisfaction would establish
with certainty that a person does understand the words.he
is using to make an introspective report.

The satisfaction

of these criteria, of course, does not rule out the logical
possibility that the reporter does not know how to use the
relevant words, and it may even be established with certainty later that the reporter did not in fact know how to
use the relevant words.

If by "absolute epistemological

authority" Rorty means an authority to which one could appeal to rule out these possibilities, I agree that there is
none.· But such possibilities provide no justification
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whatever for the claim in any given case that someone making an introspective report does not know how to use the
relevant words.

Even if we were to regard Rorty's statement

"this escape-hatch is always available" as an ellipsis for
"this escape-hatch is always available in any isolated case
of conflict between an introspective report and an EEG
report in the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument,"
the above criticism would still apply.

For there are some

imaginable cases of this kind in which there would be no justification whatever for the claim that the reporter does not
know how to use the relevant words.

Such a case, for exam-

ple, would be one in which someone who does not exhibit painbehavior and has a long history of the correct use of the
word "pain" reports that he has no pain, but an EEG report
says that the brain process correlated with pain did occur.
To reply that in any such case the

"~

priori improbability"

of "the body of current scientific theory foundering upon the
rock of a single over-riding report" 1 gives some justification to the claim that the reporter does not know how to
use the relevant words would be, as

1

Rorty, ibid., p. 51.

I

have argued, to appeal
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to a highly exaggerated picture of the situation.
The circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument, accordingly, do not preclude the occurrence of isolated cases of
conflict between an honest first-person present-tense sensation-report and an EEG report in which it would be rational
to conclude that the reporter does know how to use the relevant words.

This does not imply, however, that the existence

of a well-confirmed theory correlating sensations with brain
processes would provide any special reason for introducing
criteria whose satisfaction would establish that someone
using a sensation-word correctly on a certain occasion to
make an honest report about his own current sensation is
mistaken.

And, if the foregoing argument is correct, such

a theory would not provide any special reason for introducing these criteria.

A given kind of sensation is correlated

with a given kind of brain process only under certain conditions.

A conflict between an honest avowal of sensation

by someone who is granted mastery of the language and an
EEG report would prompt a search after the relevant difference or differences between the anomalous case and all other
cases so far observed.
may be found.

And in fact no relevant difference

But why should this be thought to show or
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provide any reason for saying that the person whose avowal
it is has made a mistake?

As things are, our criteria for

the existence and character of sensations consist in the
occurrence of certain kinds of behavior.

But the occurrence

of a given kind of behavior is our criterion for the existence of a given kind of sensation only in certain circumstances.

A conflict between an honest avowal of sensation

by someone who is granted mastery of the language and his
(non-verbal) behavior would prompt a search after something
in the circumstances which made them abnormal.
been hypnotized, 1 drugged, electrified, etc.?

Has he
Is his body

subject periodically to unexpected and uncontrollable convulsions, etc.?

And in fact nothing unusual may be found.

But, as things are, this would not show or provide any

1

Morick argues that if we judge that a hypnotized man
who says, "I am in pain" is in fact not in pain, "then ipso
facto we judge that his hypnotic 'I am in pain' fails to
display knowledge of the correct use of this sentence for
avowing pain" (.£E_. cit., p. 294). For reasons I shall not
enter into here, I think his argument incorrect, but even if
it were correct, it would not follow that if we judge that
a hypnotized man who says, "I am in pain" is in fact not in
pain, then ipso facto we judge that he does notklow how to
use the word "pain." For the judgment that a man fails to
display knowledge does not carry the implication that he
lacks the knowledge he fails to display. And there are cri~
teria whose satisfaction would establish with certainty that
a hypnotized man whom we judge not in fact.to be in pain
when he says, "I am in pain" knows how to use the word
"pain."
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reason for saying that the person whose avowal it is has made
a mistake.

The failure to find something in the circumstances

which made them abnormal would be a reason either for looking further or for throwing up one's hands in despair of
ever making sense of this piece of behavior.

The analogy

between the way things are and the way things would be given
the existence of a well-confirmed theory correlating sensations with brain processes partially breaks down here.

To

throw up one's hands in despair when faced with an apparent
disconfirmatory instance of a well-confirmed law does not
manifest a scientific attitude.

A scientifically respectable

response, however, whose only purpose is to forestall an
open declaration of despair is that of protecting the law
with ad hoc assumptions.

It is true that such "protection"

very quickly approaches the limits of scientific respectability. 1

Even when these limits are reached, however, one

need not abandon the law.
it.

One can simply cease to protect

If the law is fundamental to current scientific explana-

tions, it would not be irrational to continue to employ it

1 cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind
(London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul, 1968), p. 110.
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for explanation and prediction while acknowledging the existence of evidence against it.

Such an attitude toward the

law would resemble the present attitude of a large part of
the sciJ;:ntific community toward the wave and particle interpretations of quantum mechanics.

On the other hand, if the

law is not fundamental to current scientific explanations,
these explanations would have little to fear from its abandonment.
That the circumstances envisaged by the EEG argument
are circumstances in which it would be reasonable to introduce criteria whose satisfaction would establish that someone
using a sensation-word correctly on a certain occasion to
make an honest report about his own current sensation is
mistaken, accordingly, cannot be shown by the EEG argument.
If this cannot be shown by the EEG argument, however, there
is good reason to think that this cannot be shown at all.
For it would be reasonable to introduce such criteria only
if it already made sense for a person to be mistaken, say,
as to whether he is in pain.

But this makes sense only if

it also makes sense for a person to be in doubt as to whether he is in pain.

And it is senseless for a person to be

in doubt as to whether he is in pain where it is senseless
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for a person to find out whether i1e is in pain.

But ft is

senseless for a person to find out whether he is in pain.
For consider the possible ways in which, it might be said,
a person could find out whether he is in pain.

It might be

said that a person could find out whether he is in pain by
applying to himself a physiological criterion of pain.

But

it would make sense for a person to apply to himself a physiclogical criterion of pain only if such a criterion had been
introduced.

Since

~

hypothesi it would not be reasonable

to introduce such a criterion unless it already made sense
for a person to be mistaken as to whether he is in pain,
however, it would not be reasonable to introduce one unless
it already made sense for a person to find out whether he is
in pain.

Or it might be said that a person could find out

whether he is in pain by observing his pain.

But there is

no difference between observing one's own pain and having it.
What this proposal comes to then is that a person could find
out whether he is in pain from his pain, that is, simply
.
.
or not h aving
i' t • 1
b y h aving

Now there is a (possible)

:tnus proposal is defended by Gregory Sheridan. See
his article, "The Electroencephalogram Argument against
Incorrigibility," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6
(1969), p. 69.
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sense of "find out" in which it is true that a person does
find out whether he is in pain by having or not having a
pain, but this is not the sense of "find out" in which it
must make sense for a person to find out whether he is in
pain if it is to make sense for a person to be in doubt as to
whether he is in pain.

A person finds out whether he is in

pain by having or not having a pain in the sense that having
or not having a pain puts him in a position and gives him the
right to say that he is in pain or that he is not in pain. 1
It is senseless, however, for a person to be in doubt about
what he can find out in this sense.

If it is to make sense

for a person to be in doubt as to whether he is in pain, it
must make sense for him to find out whether he is in pain
in the sense in which he can find out, say, the position of
his limbs, that is, by a kind of observing which goes beyond
the mere having of what is being observed.

A person does

not find out that his arm is straight in the sense that his
arm's being straight puts him in a position and gives him

1 cf. A. J. Ayer, "Privacy," in his The Concept of~ Person (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963),p. 64; Sydney
Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge~ Self-Identity (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 216; William Alston,
"Varieties of Privileged Access," American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 8 (1971), p. 234.
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the right to say that his arm is straight.

For it is not

senseless for someone honestly to say that his arm is bent
when it is straight.

Normally, a person knows whether his

arm is straight without finding out whether his arm is
straight.

But it does make sense for a person to find out

whether his arm is straight (and indeed it must make sense,
since a person can be mistaken as to whether his arm is
straight)--not by observing his kinesthetic sensations,
which is a kind of observing, if it may be called an "observing" at all, that does not go beyond the mere having of
what is being observed, but by looking. 1
Consider, then, whether it does make sense for a person
to find out whether he is in pain by observing whether he
is in pain in the sense of "observing" which goes beyond the
mere having of what is being observed.

The only plausible

1 This seems to be Malcolm's point in the passage from
"The Privacy of Experience" (in Avrum Stroll (ed.), Epistemology (New York, Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 147-151)
wfiich Sheridan is criticizing when he claims that a person
finds out whether he is in pain by having or not having a
pain. Sheridan asks: "Why would I have to observe my own
behavior and listen to my words in order not to be in doubt
about my sensations? Would I not still know my sensations
as a result of directly experiencing them?," (~. cit., p.
69). The point, however, is not that the introduction of
first-person doubts into the language of sensations commits us to the view that a person would have to observe
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object of observation in this sense, I believe, is a person's pain-behavior.

The proposal then is that a person

finds out whether he is in pain by observing his own painbehavior. 1

Now how could a person find out whether he is in

pain in this sense of "find out?"

As Wittgenstein remarks

it would be necessary for him to take notion of himself as
others do, to listen to himself talking, to be able to
I

draw conclusions from what he says.

2

But if this were possible

his own behavior and listen to his own words in order not
to be in doubt about his sensations, but rather that it would
have to make sense for a person to observe his own behavior
and listen to his own words in order to find out what his
sensations are.
1Although it is not really clear, this proposal seems
to be defended by Rorty in "Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Inconununicability, 11 American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), p. 202. Rorty speaks of a person's
utterances and inclinations or dispositions to utter certain first-person reports such as, "I am in pain" as his
evidence for the truth of the proposition that he is in
pain. He also speaks, however, of a person's belief that
he is in pain as his evidence for the truth of the proposition that he is in pain. This suggests that it is not by
observing one's own pain-behavior that one finds out whether one is in pain. Yet, by "belief" he seems to mean "the
expression of belief." This is suggested by his remark
" • • • other people certainly take my beliefs about my
mental states as evidence for their own beliefs about my
mental states. So why shouldn't I?" In any case, his
defense of the view set forth in this passage is simply
that its denial carries the "paradoxical" implication that
there is no genuine use of the verb "to know" as an expression of certainty with first-person present-tense sensation
statements.
·
2 see Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 192.
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it would make sense to say such things as "Judging from
what I say, I must be in pain" and "It seems to me that
I am not in pain, but, judging from what I say, this
isn't true. "

"Monologues 11 c£. the sort imagined by Malcolm

would also make sense:
it hurt?'

"I shall sometimes ask myself, 'Does

If I reply, "Yes, it does,' then I shall know

that I have pain, my evidence being that I myself said ~1

111

But, further, others notice and draw conclusions from not only
what a person says but also what a person does.
is what pain-explanations explain.

Pain-behavior

Declining an invitation,

making an appointment to see the dentist, hiring someone to
do the heavy work involved in running one's business, even a
person's selling his business and marrying someone who he
knows can be depended on to take care of him are sometimes
2
.
.
b e h avior.
.
instances
o f pain-

If, then, a person could take

notice of himself and draw conclusions from his own behavior
as others do, it would make sense to say such things as
"Judging from the fact that I am trying to sell my business
and have proposed to Mary, I must be in pain" and "It seems
to me that I am not in pain, but, judging from the fact that I

2 cf. supra, chap. II, pp. 37-41.
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am trying to sell my business and have proposed to Mary,
this isn't true."
sense.

But to say such things does not make

They are senseless in the sense that we would not

understand the Eerson who said them.

Wittgenstein remarks:

"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. 111
The reason why we could not understand him is not that we
could not understand what he said.

We could not understand

him, because his verbal behavior would diverge too far from
the normal behavior of beings to whom we ordinarily apply
the concept of a person.

Whatever the lion said would be

senseless in the sense that we would never understand him.
It is of course false that we would never be able to understand a person who exhibited the sort of verbal behavior
we have been imagining.

But this behavior would have the

same sort of unintelligibility that would for us be a feature of the verbal behavior of any being not falling under
the concept of a person.

l

Op. . cit., p. 223.

Cf. supra, chap. II, Pp. 54-55.
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